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INTRODUCTION
In his passionate dissent in Bush v. Gore,1 Justice John Paul Ste-
vens predicted that "the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impar-
tial guardian of the rule of law" would be deeply shaken by the Court's
decision to stop the recount for the disputed presidential election and
ultimately to decide the outcome in favor of candidate George W.
Bush.' Justice Stevens's prediction seemed to have been borne out in
the weeks and months following the Court's December 12, 2000 deci-
sion. Scores of lawyers, court watchers, and journalists expressed
profound disappointment with the Court's decision.' In the days fol-
lowing December 12, voters sent angry telegrams and letters to the
Court.4 Some, suggesting that the Court had stolen their right to
vote, sent their voter registrations cards to the Court.5 Lawyers admit-
ted to practice in the Supreme Court bar reportedly withdrew their
admission from the Court.6 In an ad appearing onJanuary 13, 2001,
in the New York Times, 585 law professors denounced the decision.7
This firestorm of criticism has abated somewhat. Some polls appear
to suggest that at the very least voters have attempted to put Bush v.
Gore behind them.' Yet, lingering doubts remain about the legitimacy
of the Supreme Court's role in ending the 2000 presidential election
dispute.9
1. 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 129.
3. See Randall Kennedy, Contempt of Court, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, at 15 (calling
the Supreme Court's decision a "scandal"); see also Robert G. Kaiser, Slim Majority Raises
Fear of Court Partisanship, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2000, at A32 (describing the surprise and
astonishment of many legal scholars after the Court granted certiorari); Mary McGrory,
Supreme Travesty of Justice, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A3 (describing the decision as a
"travesty" motivated purely by political and personal desires); Jeffrey Rosen, Disgrace: The
Supreme Court Commits Suicide, NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Dec. 14, 2000, available at http://
www.thenewrepublic.com/122500/rosenl22500.html (criticizing the opinion as a "shabby
piece of work" that has destroyed the faith of Americans in the Court).
4. Joan Biskupic, Election Still Splits Court, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2001, at IA.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Nat Hentoff, A Herd of Legal Minds: Professors Take on the Supreme Court, WASH. TIMES,
Feb. 19, 2001, at A17.
8. SeeJanet Elder, The 43rd President: The Polls, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2000, at A22 (re-
porting that a majority of people polled, 54%, believe the Court made the right decision
when it stopped the Florida recount and that Americans have other priorities); see also
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the
Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32, 38 (2001) (concluding that there have been minimal
changes in the Supreme Court's overall approval rating since Bush v. Gore).
9. See Akhil Reed Amar, Should We Trust Judges?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2000, at 1 (criti-
cizing the opinion in Bush v. Gore as being logically, historically, and constitutionally
flawed); see also Jack M. Balkin, Supreme Court Compromises Its Legitimacy, BOSTON GLOBE,
Dec. 12, 2000, at A23 (pointing out the irony of the decision and arguing that the Court
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In this Article, I focus on a set of allegations that surfaced and
quickly died during the first weeks of December 2000. These allega-
tions suggested that several of the Justices on the Court should have
disqualified themselves from participation in Bush v. Gore in order to
avoid the appearance of bias. The Justices-Scalia, O'Connor, and
Thomas-were alleged, as a result of either their conduct or their
connection to litigants in the case, to have an interest in the outcome
of the litigation from which their impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. 0 At the time, most legal ethics experts concluded that
the Justices had not violated ethical rules or guidelines governing judi-
cial conduct and recusal." I examine these allegations ofjudicial con-
flict and reach a dilfferent conclusion. I contend that these and other
allegations of conflict involving Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
O'Connor constituted grounds upon which the Justices should have
felt compelled to recuse themselves from participation in the case, or
taken other less severe measures, to avoid the appearance of impartial-
ity. Instead, by failing to take any action to ameliorate the appearance
of bias in Bush v. Gore, these Supreme Court Justices effectively ex-
empted themselves from the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and
Canon 3(E) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibit
ruled purely on ideological and political grounds); Linda Greenhouse, Collision with Politics
Risks Court's Legal Credibility, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2000, at Al (stating that the Court "has
now placed itself in the midst of the political thicket where it has always most doubted its
institutional competence"); Edward Lazarus, For the Supremes, a Basic Test of Legitimacy...,
WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2000, at A27 (predicting that the Court would rule in favor of Bush,
scuttling the principle of "states' rights" and calling into question the Court's legitimacy).
10. One ofJustice Scalia's sons is a partner in the law firm that represented then-candi-
date Bush in Bush v. Gore. Another of Scalia's sons had recently become an associate at
another firm representing then-candidate Bush. Brooks Jackson, Ethics Experts, Say Scalia,
Thomas Connections Not Conflicts of Interest (Dec. 12, 2000), available at http://
www.CNN.com/2000/LAW/12/12/supreme.court.conflict; Bob Woodward & Charles
Lane, Scalia Takes a Leading Role in Case, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 2000, at Al. Justice
O'Connor is alleged to have made comments on election night that revealed a bias in favor
of candidate Bush. JEFFREY TOOBIN, Too CLOSE TO CALL: THE THIRTY-SIx-DAY BATTLE TO
DECIDE THE 2000 ELECTION 249 (2001). Virginia Lamp Thomas, the wife of Justice
Thomas, as a senior fellow of the conservative think-tank Heritage Foundation, actively
sought the resumes of potential candidates to serve in the new presidential administration
during the pendency of Bush v. Gore. Christopher Marquis, Job of Thomas's Wife Raises Con-
flict-of-Interest Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A26.
11. See Jackson, supra note 10 (reporting that ethics experts concluded that neither
Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas had a conflict of interest in Bush v. Gore); see also Robert
L. Jackson, Calls for Recusal of Thomas, Scalia Are Undue, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13,
2000, at A25 (explaining that some legal ethics experts found no reason for Justices Scalia
and Thomas to recuse themselves). But see Democrat Urges Scalia to Bow Out of Florida Case,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 2000, at 9A (quoting Lanny Davis, former special counsel
to President Clinton, who suggested that Scalia should "explain why recusal, at least for
appearances' sake, isn't desirable").
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judges from hearing cases in which their "impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned."12 Moreover, the failure of the Justices to act in
this regard reflects a broader problem: the lack of clear guidelines
governing the recusal practices of the Justices in cases where the ap-
pearance of bias is at issue.
In Part I of this Article, I provide some background on the "ap-
pearance" of bias standard contained in Canon 3(E) of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct and the federal judicial disqualification stat-
ute, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Both require that judges withdraw from par-
ticipating in cases in which their "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned."13 In Part II, I examine the specific facts that gave rise to
allegations that the participation of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
O'Connor in Bush v. Gore compromised the appearance of impartiality
of those Justices in the case. 14 I contend that the participation of
these Justices in Bush v. Gore likely violated the spirit and letter of 28
U.S.C. § 455(a) and Canon 3(E) of the Model Code.
In Part III, I examine the only formal attempt to disqualify a
judge from hearing one of the Bush v. Gore election challenges based
12. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000); MODEL CODE OF JUDICLAL CONDUCr Canon 3(E)(1)
(2000). Some might contend that the case of Bush v. Gore is so unique that it is a distorted
lens through which to explore the issue ofjudicial impartiality on the Supreme Court. But
in my view, while many of the judicial bias issues raised by Bush v. Gore are idiosyncratic,
many others are paradigmatic of the problems that plague the overall system for monitor-
ing and evaluating the Court's compliance with the appearance of impartiality standard
promulgated by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and by the American Bar Association in
the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
13. Only 28 U.S.C. § 455, however, is an enforceable statutory provision. The Model
Code provisions are "statements of norms" developed by the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility after consultation with
judges, the bar, and the public. The Canons contained in the Code provide guidelines for
the appropriate "ethical conduct ofjudges." MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCr Preamble
(2000).
14. I recognize, of course, that many other actual or potential conflicts involving these
same Justices or otherJustices on the Court and the litigants in Bush v. Gore may exist. For
example, prior to the December 10, 2000 Supreme Court argument in Bush v. Gore, con-
servative columnist Robert Novak reported thatJustice Kennedy enjoyed a close friendship
with Laurence Tribe, counsel for Al Gore in the Supreme Court during the first argument.
Robert Novak, Gore's Last, Desperate Chance, CHL SuN-TMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at 35. This Arti-
cle is not meant to constitute an investigation of all potential conflicts of interest between
members of the High Court and the litigants in Bush v. Gore. Nor do I intend to offer here
a substantive critique of the outcome or judicial reasoning of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bush v. Gore. Others have already presented persuasive and thorough critiques of
the majority's deeply flawed decision. See David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They
Thinking?, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 184, 186 (Cass R. Sunstein
& Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001) (stating that "[t] he decision in Bush v. Gore was not dic-
tated by the law in any sense"); see also Jamin B. Raskin, Bandits in Black Robes: Why You
Should Still Be Angry About Bush v. Gore, WASH. MONTHLY, Mar. 2001, at 25, 25 (calling the
decision the worst in history).
MARYIAND LAW REVIEW
on the appearance of bias. The recusal motion filed against Judge
Nikki Clark-the only African-American trial judge to hear one of the
Bush v. Gore cases-demonstrates that although the Justices on the Su-
preme Court may be insulated from challenges based on the appear-
ance of bias, minority judges remain vulnerable to race-based
challenges to their impartiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
In Part IV, I argue that Justices on the Supreme Court have a
special obligation to provide leadership and guidance to judges and
the bar in avoiding the appearance of bias. That obligation was never
more important than during Bush v. Gore, a case that would decide the
presidential election for a deeply divided country. In Bush v. Gore,
several Justices could and should have undertaken a variety of mea-
sures-including but not limited to recusal-that would have dimin-
ished the appearance of judicial bias in that case. I try to identify
some of these actions in Part IV.
I. JUDGING, IMPARTIALITY, AND APPEARANCES
A. The Importance of Appearances in Judicial Decision-Making
Judicial impartiality is one of the core elements of due process.
15
Just as litigants are entitled to an impartial jury, so too are litigants
guaranteed the right to appear before a judge who is free of bias. 6
But in addition to prohibiting actual judicial bias, the Supreme Court
has held that the appearance ofjudicial bias can also threaten due pro-
cess.' 7 In the words of the Supreme Court, 'justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."'"
That judicial decision-making must appear to be free of bias is pre-
mised on the widely held belief that public confidence is essential to
upholding the legitimacy of the judiciary.' 9 Judges have no armies to
enforce their decisions.20 In the federal courts, and in a dozen states,
15. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (observing that it is a violation of due
process to subject a criminal defendant to a judge with an interest in the outcome of the
proceeding).
16. See id. at 535 (concluding that defendants have the right to have an impartial
judge).
17. See Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 (1954) (explaining that a judge has an
obligation to maintain composure and a solemn tone in proceedings to ensure fairness to
the parties).
18. Id. at 14.
19. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 cmt. (2000) (commenting that
"[d]eference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence in
the integrity and independence ofjudges").
20. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (stating that the Court
could not "independently coerce obedience to its decrees").
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the judiciary is appointed and thus does not even carry the imprima-
tur of legitimacy that legislators derive from being elected "by the peo-
ple."' 2 1 Instead, the judiciary-especially the appointed judiciary-
derives its authority and legitimacy from the willingness of the people
and sister branches of government to accept and submit to its deci-
sions.22 Because public confidence is so essential to maintaining the
integrity of the bench, even the appearance of bias, parochialism, or
favoritism can threaten the judicial function.23
Despite this now standard argument, the public perception of
judges and the judiciary as nonpolitical, neutral decision-makers, has
been deeply eroded during the past fifty years.2 4 Indeed,judicial deci-
sion-making has increasingly come under fire for being "activist," "par-
tisan," "imperial," or "legislative."25 The legitimacy of the judiciary as
a whole has been challenged by a variety of constituencies-from con-
servative activists and politicians to minority voters. 26 State judicial
21. Lindsay G. Robertson, Neutral Principles and Judicial Legitimacy, 54 OILA. L. REv. 53,
55 (2001).
22. See Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 865 ("The Court's power lies.., in its legitimacy,
a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance of the
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare what it
demands.").
23. In this Article, I do not take issue with this line of reasoning. Rather, assuming that
this argument is a sound one-as many do-I explore whether Justices on the Court were
sufficiently attentive to the appearance of bias in Bush v. Gore. Justices O'Connor, Souter,
Kennedy, and Breyer have spoken passionately about the importance of deciding cases in
ways that promote the Court's legitimacy. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 157-58 (2000)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that public confidence in the Court is a "public treasure"
and important to protect basic liberty); see also Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 864-67 (dis-
cussing the basis of the Court's power and the need to guard against undermining the
legitimacy of the Court).
24. Jack Wade Nowlin, The Constitutional Illegitimacy of Expansive Judicial Power: A Populist
Structural Interpretive Analysis, 89 Ky. L.J. 387, 389-90 (2001).
25. See 146 CONG. REc. S7758 (daily ed.July 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (artic-
ulating a serious concern "about whether the Court has embarked on a program of judicial
activism"); 146 CONG. REc. S7598 (daily ed. July 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. Biden) (at-
tacking the "imperial judiciary" and its federalism jurisprudence); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Rehnquist Court and Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37, 37 (1999) (" [T]he
Rehnquist Court is an activist, conservative Court.... It is conservative... in the sense that
it is animated by the right-wing political agenda.").
26. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al.
In about a dozen cases brought during the 1980s and 1990s, African-Americans, Latinos,
and Native Americans challenged methods of electing judges that prevented minority vot-
ers from electing judicial candidates of their choice. See Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp.
285, 287 (M.D. La. 1988), appeal dismissed, 958 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1992) (challenging the
method of electing family court, district court, and court of appeals judges in Louisiana as
violating the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); see also League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 838 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994)
(challenging the single-district method of electing trial judges in Texas as discriminatory
against Mexican-American and African-American voters). In those cases, minority groups,
MARYLAND LAW REviEW
election contests have become increasingly politicized and conten-
tious. In 1985, a candidate running for Chief Judge of the Texas
Court of Appeals broke the $1 million mark for campaign spending. 27
The role of special interest groups in judicial campaigns has further
changed the landscape of judicial election contests in many states.
These groups launch sophisticated and targeted campaigns againstju-
dicial candidates often using inflammatory language, distorted facts,
or racial appeals.28
The federal judiciary has not been immune from this increasingly
contentious climate. Nominations and confirmation hearings for fed-
eral court seats have become overtly hostile, 29 political,30 and racial.3'
in essence, challenged the structural exclusion of minority-supported judges from the
bench. For a description of how plaintiffs in these cases sought structural impartiality
through diversity on the bench, see generally Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges: Racial
Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997) [here-
inafter Ifill, Judging the Judges]. I argue that a judiciary that persistently excludes the per-
spectives of minorities and other traditionally excluded groups cannot be impartial. Id. at
98-99; see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public
Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 405, 405 (2000) [hereinafter Ifill, Racial Diversity on the
Bench] (arguing that racial diversity among judges is necessary to achieve cultural pluralism
in legal decision-making).
27. See "60 Minutes Examines" Controversy Over Donations to Judges, Hous. POST, Dec. 7,
1987, at 2A (describing the controversy over lawyers' contributions to the campaigns of
Texas Supreme Court judges); see also Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial
Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1391, 1394-96 (2001) (describing the changing nature of
judicial campaigns). It has been estimated that $62,000,000 is spent on judicial election
contests annually. See Roy Schotland, Financing the 2000 Election: Change and Challenge, in
FINANCING THE 2000 ELECTIONS (David Magleby ed., forthcoming 2002).
28. See Champagne, supra note 27, at 1404 (quoting a North Carolina Supreme Court
justice's description of these tactics). The voting record of incumbent judges is often ex-
amined and labeled "soft on crime," "activist," or "anti-death penalty." Racial appeals are
also deployed by interest groups. For example, in 1988 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a group
calling itself "the Committee to Preserve Judicial Integrity" mailed out a flyer to white
neighborhoods in the City showing photographs of five white incumbentjudges contrasted
with photos of five black candidates challenging the incumbents for seats on the bench.
The flyer urged "Let's protect the integrity of the Courts ... Re-elect our Judges." Com-
mittee to Preserve Judicial Integrity News Flyer (on file with author); see also Champagne,
supra note 27, at 1394 (describing actions of deputy district attorneys in Los Angeles that
"encouraged opposition to judges they believed were soft on crime").
29. The Supreme Court nominations of Judge Robert Bork and Justice Clarence
Thomas are widely regarded as among the most contested and volatile in the history of the
Court. Of course many forget that the nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court was at least as, and perhaps more,
contentious. See generally Nomination of Thurgood Marshall, of New York, to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.
(1967); JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 332-38 (1998).
Justice Marshall's grilling at the hands of segregationist southern senators on the Judiciary
Committee was characterized by overtly hostile and racist challenges to Marshall's fitness
and qualification to serve. WILLIAMS, supra, at 334-37.
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Attacks on judicial decision-making have increased as well 2 -with
some of these attacks coming from the bench itself.3 3 Federal judges
feel increasingly compelled to respond to public attacks on judicial
decision-making.
34
Although politics, ideology, race, and gender considerations have
long played a role in the nomination and selection of federal judges,
these machinations were traditionally conducted behind the scenes. 5
30. The Republican-dominated Senate moved along President Clinton's nominations
to the federal bench at a snail's pace, despite a critical shortage of federal judges in several
jurisdictions. Recently, Republicans have charged the now-Democrat-controlled Senate
with politically motivated delays of President Bush's nominees to the bench. See David G.
Savage, Senate Confirms 1st Round ofJudges, CHI. TmiB.,July 21, 2001, at N1O (describing the
ongoing political struggle in confirming federal judges). Chief Justice Rehnquist recently
criticized the political delay ofjudicial nominations by the formerly Republican-controlled
Senate and by the now-Democrat-controlled Senate. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Sees a
Loss of Prospective Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at A16.
31. For eight years Senator Jesse Helms reportedly blocked hearings on African-Ameri-
can judicial candidates proposed by President Clinton to fill vacancies on the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. Debra Baker, Waiting and Wondering, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 52, 53.
The Fourth Circuit, which includes Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and North Carolina
has the largest black population of any federal circuit, yet no black judge had ever served
on the Fourth Circuit until the year 2000. Id. In 2000, President Clinton bypassed the
Senate confirmation process to make a recess appointment to the Fourth Circuit. See Sav-
age, supra note 30. As a result, Roger Gregory, a Virginia lawyer, became the first black to
sit on the Fourth Circuit. In 2001, President Bush officially appointed Judge Gregory to
the Fourth Circuit. Judge Gregory was confirmed by the Senate. Id.
32. In 1996-a presidential election year-attacks on federal court judicial decision-
making became particularly virulent. See Linda Greenhouse, Judges as Political Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1996, at Al (noting that Republican presidential candidates "outdid one
another" in their attempts to rid the nation of"liberal judges"). The appointment of more
conservative justices to the nation's federal courts became a presidential campaign issue
during that year. See id. (noting that two Republican presidential hopefuls, Patrick
Buchanan and Bob Dole, made the federal judiciary a regular topic of their campaign
speeches).
33. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Disorder in the Court: Judges Squabble Over Proceedings Surround-
ing Ohio Man's Stay of Execution, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2001, at A3 (describing a dispute
between judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit over a stay of
execution for a death row convict).
34. See Neil MacFarquhar, Federal Judge to Resign, Citing Political Attacks on Judiciary, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 1996, at B4 (citing Third Circuit Judge H. Lee Sarokin's self-described in-
ability to ignore political attacks as the reason for his resignation); see also Second Circuit
Chief Judges Criticize Attacks on Judge Baer, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 29, 1996, at 4 (describing a state-
ment authored by judges on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
condemning attacks on judicial decision-making as a threat to the independence of Article
III judges).
35. See, e.g., JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 227-33 (2001) (describing in detail the
intensely political and often crude considerations that influenced President Nixon's selec-
tion of then-Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist to fill a vacant seat on the Su-
preme Court); see also id. at 181, 183-84 (alleging that then-Chief Justice Burger privately
threatened to resign if President Nixon appointed a woman to the Court).
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The image presented to the public was one that reinforced the image
of the judiciary as a neutral locus of considered and dispassionate de-
cision-making. In fact, the federal judiciary itself has taken great pains
to foster an image of neutrality. The Supreme Court in particular has
aggressively worked to protect the image of its decision-making as
above the fray of politics, personal interest, or internecine battles.3 6
By emphasizing cohesiveness, unanimity, and collegiality, the Justices
have fostered an image of the judiciary as principled and apolitical."
Even after the sharply divided decision in Bush v. Gore, several of the
Court's Justices made certain in their public statements to downplay
or debunk reports of lingering tension in the Court's chambers. A
day after the decision, Justice Thomas used a previously scheduled
talk with high school students to insist that where the Court is con-
cerned, "don't try to apply the rules of the political world." 8 Other
Justices made similar remarks during this period, emphasizing as well
that no rancor existed between the Justices as a result of the sharply
divided decision.39 These rather unconvincing efforts at damage con-
trol in the weeks following December 12, 2000 reflect the importance
the Justices attach to maintaining an image of unity and camaraderie
as a shield against negative public scrutiny.4 °
Justices on the Court also act in more formal ways to protect the
image of the Court's decision-making as far removed from the kind of
political calculations that characterize legislative and executive deci-
sions. In highly controversial cases involving important public and di-
visive policy issues, members of the Court have often worked hard to
garner sufficient votes to issue unanimous opinions in order to both
36. See Lewis F. Powell,Jr., What Really Goes on at the Supreme Court, in DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 83, 83-86 (1997); see also WILLIAMS, supra note
29, at 353 (explaining that Justice Marshall felt that the Court was "like family"); cf David
Von Drehle, Nine Decisive Votes, Deep Political Peril, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2000, at Al (noting
that in recent years the Court's legitimacy has remained intact while the Presidency and
the Congress have been damaged in the public eye in the wake of President Clinton's
impeachment proceedings).
37. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS
372-78 (3d ed. 1993) (discussing the relationship between public opinion and the Su-
preme Court, and noting that "the Court's prestige rests on preserving the public's view
that justices base their decisions on . . . the law, rather than on their personal policy
preferences").
38. Neil A. Lewis, Justice Thomas Speaks Out on a Timely Topic, Several of Them, in Fact, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A23.
39. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: How THE COURT DECIDED THE
2000 PRESIDEN-TIAL ELECTION 172-73 (2001) (citing the remarks of Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Breyer).
40. See id. at 173 ("One need not wonder whether the judges doth protest too much to
realize that the specter of illegitimate partisan decision-making was in the air.").
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protect the Court as an institution and to insulate individual Justices
from partisan or ideological attacks.41 Unanimous opinions also en-
courage public acceptance of difficult or even unpopular Court deci-
sions by suggesting a kind of unassailable inevitability to the Court's
determinations.42
By refusing to act, the Court can also protect its image. Denying
certiorari review, for example, is one of the most powerful ways the
Court acts to avoid controversial cases that have potentially broad and
politically divisive public policy impact.4 Likewise, the Court's adher-
ence to stare decisis protects its members from charges ofjudicial bias
or partiality. In effect, stare decisis preserves the rule of law, but also
helps judges deflect public criticism and censure.44
Even when the Court takes on cases involving highly divisive is-
sues, its decisions can reflect the Justices' concern with maintaining
public confidence. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Justices O'Connor,
Souter, and Kennedy spoke candidly about the Court's need to decide
41. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 693-99 (1976) (discussing Chief Justice Earl
Warren's ultimately successful efforts to issue a unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education); see also HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-
1835, at 100 (1997) (crediting Chief Justice Marshall for creating "the 'opinion of the
Court' device" to shield individual Justices from negative attention associated with publicly
divisive or unpopular opinions).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (ordering the President to
comply with a subpoena seeking the Watergate tapes). United States v. Nixon was a unani-
mous 8-0 decision, after Justice Rehnquist-a former Assistant Attorney General under
President Nixon-recused himself from the case. Id. at 685; see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958) (issuing a unanimous opinion ordering defiant state officials to comply
with a federal court order requiring desegregation of Arkansas high schools). Elsewhere I
have cautioned, however, that reliance on unanimous opinions to promote acceptance of
difficult decisions inhibits the expression representation function ofjudging. Ifill, Racial
Diversity on the Bench, supra note 26, at 472-73; see also Robert Rubinson, The Polyphonic Court-
room: Expanding the Possibilities ofJudicialDiscourse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 3, 18 (1996) (criticizing
the typical majority opinion as suppressing individual judicial viewpoints and discouraging
debate).
43. See H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 243 (1991) (maintaining that the Court will likely deny certiorari to a
petition that raises an intractable problem). Some argue, however, that the Court's avoid-
ance of difficult and contentious questions, particularly when it does so selectively, impov-
erishes our "long-term constitutional dialogue" and leaves potentially unconstitutional
"temporary or local majoritarian impulses" unchecked. LIsA A. KLOPPENBERG, PLAING IT
SAFE: HOW THE SUPREME COURT SIDESTEPS HARD CASES AND STUNTS THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LAw 16 (2001); see also Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1494-96 (2000) (suggesting that because the judiciary is insulated
from majoritarian pressures, it has an advantage in protecting individual rights).
44. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Every-
body ElseDoes), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 22 (1993) ("[I]fjudges considered every case afresh
they would.., lose the protection from criticism and attack that comes from being able to
blame an unpopular decision on someone else (that is, on earlier judges).").
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cases in ways that are "sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Na-
tion."45 They recognized that "[t]he Court must take care to speak
and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms
the Court claims for them, as grounded truly in principle . "..."46 In
effect, Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy explicitly acknowl-
edged that the Court's decision-making must not only be legitimate, but
must also appear to be legitimate in order to preserve the public's sense
of confidence in the Supreme Court's authority.
4 7
B. Evaluating the Appearance of Bias Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)
In accordance with the demands of due process, 28 U.S.C. § 144
entitles a litigant to seek the removal of a judge from hearing a case
when "the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.
In effect, § 144 clearly disqualifies a judge from hearing a case when
he or she is actually biased in favor of or against a litigant or has an
interest in the outcome of the litigation.
28 U.S.C. § 455, however, contains a more comprehensive frame-
work than § 144 for determining recusal questions. In addition to re-
quiring disqualification when there is proof of actual bias, § 455
prohibits judges from hearing cases in which their "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. '49 Amended in 1974 to include this "ap-
pearance" standard, § 455 mirrors language that had been adopted
earlier in Canon 3(C) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.50 The
effect of the amendment of § 455 was to do away with the need of
showing actual bias and to impose an objective standard for evaluating
recusal questions.51 Rather than focusing on a judge's sense of
whether his disqualification is warranted, the new § 455(a) standard
45. 505 U.S. 833, 866 (1992).
46. Id. at 865.
47. Professor Deborah Hellman argues that given the views they expressed in Casey,
these Justices were especially obligated to be attentive to the appearance of their actions in
Bush v. Gore. Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Govern-
ment, and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REv. 653, 672-73 (2001).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 144 (2000). The removal provision provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely
and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a
personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such
judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to
hear such proceeding.
Id.
49. Id. § 455(a).
50. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisitions Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988).
51. Id.
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requires a judge to determine whether a reasonable person would
question the ability of the judge to impartially hear and decide the
case.5 2 As Chief Justice Rehnquist later remarked, Congress, when it
amended § 455 in 1974,
was concerned with the "appearance" of impropriety, and to
that end changed the previous subjective standard for dis-
qualification to an objective one; no longer was disqualifica-
tion to be decided on the basis of the opinion of the judge in
question, but by the standard of what a reasonable person
would think.
51
Nevertheless, neither the Model Code nor § 455(a) contain spe-
cific guidelines to aid lawyers and judges in determining how to evalu-
ate when a "reasonable person" would question the impartiality of the
judge. The Supreme Court has approved the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' determination that recusal is required when "a reasonable
person, knowing all the circumstances, would expect that the judge
would have actual knowledge" of facts that create "an appearance of
partiality.15 4 By practice in federal court and in most states, however,
the challenged judge is herself initially entrusted with the task of de-
termining whether her actions or interests give rise to the appearance
of bias.55 This reality is problematic. While there may be strong rea-
sons for a challenged judge to hear a motion for recusal based on
actual bias,56 there is little reason to believe that a judge against whom
disqualification is sought under § 455 (a) is in the best position to de-
termine whether her connection to the litigation at issue "appears"
biased to a reasonable person.
In fact, a challenged judge is in an especially poor position to
make recusal determinations under the "appearance" of bias stan-
52. Id. at 859-60.
53. Id. at 872 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
54. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860-61 (quoting Health Servs. Acquisitions Corp. v. Liljeberg,
796 F.2d 796, 802 (5th Cir. 1986)).
55. See Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges?, 28 VAL. U.
L. REv. 543, 545-46 (1994) (surveying state practices granting a challenged judge the au-
thority to determine recusal motions).
56. Id. at 559. The judge himself is likely to have or know the information most rele-
vant to a determination of actual bias, such as financial connection to one of the parties,
familial relationship with one of the parties, or participation as a lawyer in the litigation at
an earlier stage. See id. (presenting the argument of those who believe judges should rule
on their own recusal motions because they best know their "thoughts" and "feelings"). By
contrast, the appearance of bias is best evaluated from the perspective of another judge, as
it does not depend on the presence or absence of actual direct interest in the litigation. Id.
at 559-60.
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dard.57 Judges are discouraged, by a variety of institutional pressures,
from recusing themselves from cases in which there is no charge or
proof of actual bias. For example, the common law Rule of Necessity
requires that judges sit in cases when recusal would leave the litigants
with no judicial forum in which to vindicate their rights, even if the
judge may have an interest in the outcome of the litigation.58
Even in the absence of "necessity," judges often feel a strong com-
pulsion to sit and hear cases in which there is no allegation of actual
bias. 9 Justices on the Supreme Court are particularly vulnerable to
this pressure. In Laird v. Tatum, decided prior to the amendment to
§ 455, Justice Rehnquist deemed the "duty to sit" particularly compel-
ling for Supreme CourtJustices because no other judge can substitute
for an absent Justice.6 ° Rehnquist therefore discouraged Supreme
Court Justices from "'bending over backwards' . . . to deem oneself
disqualified."'"
That view continues to influence the Court's recusal practices
even though the 1974 amendment to § 455 overturned the "duty to
sit" doctrine relied on by Justice Rehnquist in Laird.6 2 By its very
terms, amended § 455 now requires that judges do precisely whatJus-
57. Id. at 559.
58. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214 (1980). For this reason, federal judges have
been permitted to hear cases involving judicial salaries. Id. at 217. If recusal were strictly
applied to those claims, no federal judge could hear those cases. Id.; see also STEPHEN GIL-
LERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW & ETHICS 596 (5th ed. 1998) (explaining
that Congress, in enacting § 455, did not intend to alter the Rule of Necessity). But see
United States v. Hatter, 519 U.S. 801, 801 (1996) (affirmed for absence of quorum).
59. See, e.g., Feichtinger v. State, 779 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Amidon v.
State, 604 P. 2d 575, 577 (Alaska 1979)). In Feichtinger, the court warned, "[w]hile we agree
that judges must avoid the appearance of bias, it is equally important to avoid the appear-
ance of shirking responsibility." Id. at 348.
60. 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.).
61. Id. at 838. Supreme Court Justices are particularly concerned that the regular
recusal of Justices may enable savvy litigators to strategize and manipulate the certiorari
petition process. Because four Justices are required to grant cert, if only one Justice
recuses himself from a cert decision, for example, a litigant is required to obtain the votes
of four out of eight, instead of four out of nine Justices.
62. See, e.g., Supreme Court of the United States, Statement of Recusal Policy, Nov. 1,
1993 (on file with author) [hereinafter Statement of Recusal Policy] (describing the Jus-
tices' negative view of "unnecessary recusal"). The fact that Justice Rehnquist may have
deliberately avoided addressing, in his Laird opinion, whether the duty to sit trumps the
.appearance" of impartiality doctrine, and given the fact that the "duty to sit" doctrine was
the subject of significant criticism at the time Laird was decided, reliance on the Laird
rationale is even more problematic. Although not part of the federal recusal statute at the
time, the appearance standard had already been included in the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct when Laird was decided. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1972). Yet
Justice Rehnquist in Laird did "not read these particular provisions as being materially
different." Laird, 409 U.S. at 825. As a result, Justice Rehnquist saw "no occasion ... to
give them separate consideration." Id.
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tice Rehnquist counseled against in Laird-"bend over backwards" to
avoid hearing cases in those instances in which their impartiality
might appear to be compromised, regardless of whether actual bias
exists. In close cases, § 455(a) warrants recusal rather than a "duty to
sit," and encourages judges to err on the side of caution in evaluating
whether to withdraw from hearing a case.63 Yetjudges continue to be
influenced by the arguments advanced in Laird in support of the "duty
to sit" doctrine.64
To be certain, Justices on the Supreme Court face legitimate con-
cerns that are not at issue for judges on other courts who are faced
with recusal motions. The fact that no other judge can replace a re-
cused Supreme CourtJustice means that ajustice's recusal from a case
raises the possibility of a 4-4 evenly divided decision. The effect of
such a split is affirmance of a lower court decision.6 5 And because
certiorari decisions require the approval of four Justices, recusal from
consideration of a certiorari petition places a greater burden on the
party seeking cert, by compelling the party to obtain four votes out of
eight, rather than four votes from nine Justices.6 6 Nevertheless, in
scores of cases each year, one or more of the Justices recuses him or
herself without doing violence to the orderly operation of the Court
and its decision-making function.6 7 Given the countervailing and ar-
Commentators have explored and critiqued in some detail Justice Rehnquist's incor-
rect reading of the Code provisions. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and
Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 596-608 (1987). As a result of his either inaccurate or
misleading reading of the Model Code, Justice Rehnquist never addressed whether, under
the appearance of impartiality standard, he should have disqualified himself from partici-
pating in the hearing and determination of Laird itself. See id. at 601-04.
63. See United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989) (interpreting the 1974
amendment of § 455 and concluding that § 455 "requires judges to resolve any doubts they
may have in favor of disqualifications"). Indeed some evidence suggests that the contro-
versy surrounding Rehnquist's refusal to withdraw from participation in the Laird case fig-
ured into Congress's deliberations in incorporating the Model Code's "appearance"
standard into § 455(a). See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355 (criticizing the "duty to sit" concept).
64. See Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 250 F.3d 315, 317-19 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Parker, J., concurring) (voting to reconsider a recusal motion en banc based on then-
Justice Rehnquist's discussion in Laird); see also United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 199, 206
(1st Cir. 1994) (Pettine, J., concurring) (citing Laird for the proposition that ajudge's view
regarding the subject matter of a case fails to provide grounds for recusal); Wessman v.
Boston Sch. Comm., 979 F. Supp. 915, 916 n.2 (D. Mass. 1997) (referring to then-Justice
Rehnquist's memorandum in Laird as "a standard for recusal decisions").
65. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996); United States
v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942).
66. See O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 246-56 (discussing the development of the so-called
"Rule of Four").
67. See Erwin N. Griswold & Ernest Gellhorn, 200 Cases in Which Justices Recused Them-
selves, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1988, at A25 (stating that between 1987 and 1988, the Supreme
619
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guably more important interest in maintaining the integrity and legiti-
macy of the Court, affirmances caused by split decisions from an
evenly divided Court and a greater burden on parties seeking cert may
simply be the unavoidable and necessary cost of strict compliance with
§ 455(a).
C. The Particular Difficulty of Discerning the Supreme Court's § 455(a)
Recusal Standards
Because Supreme Court recusal decision-making is somewhat
shrouded in mystery, it is difficult to identify uniform or consistent
standards used by the Justices in making recusal determinations based
on the "appearance" of bias.68 Supreme Court Justices are not re-
quired to issue written decisions explaining decisions to withdraw
from hearing a case.69 And of course the disqualification decisions of
Supreme Court Justices are not subject to review by other judges or
courts. Moreover, there is no public indication that the Justices utilize
any formal internal process in which Justices collectively review
§ 455(a) recusal motions raised by litigants, or collectively evaluate im-
partiality concerns raised by the Justices themselves.7y
Instead, it appears that the Justices on the Court enjoy the unre-
viewable power to determine individually whether and when to dis-
qualify themselves from cases in which their impartiality could
reasonably be questioned.7' Historically, this appears to have pro-
duced a highly idiosyncratic application of the "appearance" standard.
For example, for years Justice Thurgood Marshall reportedly recused
himself from many cases in which the NAACP or the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (the LDF) was counsel. 72 He also
recused himself from participating in the determination of whether to
Court sat without a full court in one out of every fifteen cases, and that further increases in
disqualifications are expected).
68. See Stempel, supra note 62, at 641-43 (discussing recusal practices in the Supreme
Court).
69. O'BRIEN, supra note 37, at 226.
70. Id.; see also William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court's Conference, in O'BRIEN, supra
note 36, at 87, 87-90 (describing in detail the Court's Conference, but making no mention
of how the Court considers recusal issues). It is obvious that some informal consultative
process is used, however. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000)
(order denying appeal). In a statement explaining his decision not to recuse himself from
the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "I have reviewed the relevant legal authorities and
consulted with my colleagues." Id,
71. See Stempel, supra note 62, at 621-28 (providing various episodes in Supreme Court
history in which a Justice's impartiality could be reasonably questioned).
72. See, e.g., Devine v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 469 U.S. 1203, 1204
(1985) (mem.); Lansing Bd. of Educ. v. NAACP, 438 U.S. 907 (1978) (mem.); NAACP v.
New York, 413 U.S. 345, 347 (1973).
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grant the LDF permission to file amicus briefs in a variety of cases.7 3
Marshall served first as counsel to the NAACP and then as founder
and director-counsel to the LDF for thirty-five years, before he was
named Solicitor General in 1961." 4 Yet Marshall continued to recuse
himself from LDF cases more than twenty years after he had left the
organization and begun his life as a government lawyer and judge.75
Marshall's caution does not seem to be required by § 455(a).
Whether recusal was warranted in those cases or not, Marshall's with-
drawal stands in stark contrast to the position taken by Justice Rehn-
quist in Laird v. Tatum. Laird challenged Justice Rehnquist's
participation in the case on the grounds that as an Assistant Attorney
General in the Nixon Administration, Rehnquist had testified before a
Senate Committee about the precise issue before the Court in Laird
and had participated in discussions about the Laird case during that
time as well.76 Given Justice Marshall's actions in NAACP cases and
Justice Rehnquist's in Laird, it is clear that the Justices do not adhere
to a uniform interpretation of their recusal obligations under
§ 455(a).
The virtual insulation of their recusal practice under § 455(a)
from close, critical, and informed7 7 scrutiny leaves the door open for
Supreme Court Justices to apply a more subjective standard in
§ 455(a) recusal cases, rather than the "reasonable person" standard
73. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 405 U.S. 914 (1972) (mem.); McGautha v. California, 440
U.S. 814 (1970) (mem.); Sibron v. New York, 389 U.S. 950 (1967) (mem.).
74. John P. MacKenzie, Thurgood Marshall, in IV THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS 3062, 3066-90 (Leon Fried-
man & Fred L. Israel eds., 1969).
75. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 274 (1989); Tallahassee Branch of
NAACP v. Leon County, 486 U.S. 1003, 1003 (1988). Justice Marshall's abundance of cau-
tion may reflect his shrewd acknowledgement of the reality that as the Court's only African-
American Justice, he would likely be subject to heightened scrutiny and charges of bias.
The particular vulnerability of African-American judges to charges of bias based on their
race is discussed in Ifill, Judging the Judges, supra note 26, at 114-19, and in this Article, infra,
at pt. III. Marshall is not the only Justice to exercise an abundance of caution in recusal
matters. Justice Stevens reportedly disqualified himself from hearing a case, Turnock v.
Ragsdale, 493 U.S. 987 (1989) (mem.), in which his niece was counsel-an act clearly not
required by the statute, which only bars Justices from hearing cases in which a relative
"within the third degree of relationship [to the Justice], is acting as a lawyer in the pro-
ceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(ii) (2000). See Steven Lubet, Disqualification of Supreme
Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REv. 657, 660 n.15 (1996). The third
degree of relationship is generally understood to include spouses, children, children of a
spouse, and grandchildren, but not nieces and nephews. 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3548, at 607 n.3 (2d ed. 1984).
76. Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 824-25 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist, J.).
77. The fact that the Justices do not provide written explanations for each of their
recusal decisions makes it difficult for outside observers to evaluate the Court's recusal
practices and the standards used by individual Justices.
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required by Congress in the amended statute.7" The fact that some
Justices rarely provide written opinions explaining their recusal deci-
sions, while others more routinely issue written recusal decisions,7" re-
flects the kind of personal, individualized approach the Justices take
towards recusal questions. In fact, according to one report, several of
the Justices refrain from providing written explanations of decisions
to recuse themselves from cases so as not to "embarrass another jus-
tice who chooses not to recuse in similar circumstances.o"0 If this is
true, then the Justices encourage and protect a fiercely independent
approach to their recusal determinations.
The broad latitude afforded the Justices in making these determi-
nations may be further aided by the tradition of deference and
politesse that characterizes Supreme Court practice. Although recusal
motions are filed against Justices on the Court, most litigants do not
seek disqualification-certainly not one based merely on the appear-
ance of bias-because to do so suggests a lack of confidence in a Jus-
tice's ability to evaluate the issues objectively. In the rarified world of
Supreme Court practice, such an action may constitute a breach of
protocol.8" Without hard evidence of actual bias, a litigant in the Su-
preme Court may fear exposing a Justice to embarrassing scrutiny
before his or her colleagues on the bench and before the public.
Perhaps for this reason, litigants sometimes appear to suggest indi-
rectly that a Justice's connection to a case creates the appearance of
bias, rather than formally move to disqualify the Justice from the case.
For example, in 1996, Professor Laurence Tribe included in the brief
accompanying his petition for certiorari on behalf of the University of
Texas in Texas v. Hopwood 2 a footnote describing the 1982 role of
then-Assistant Secretary of Education Clarence Thomas encouraging
the University to undertake admissions policies that would be likely to
increase the number of minorities in its graduate and professional
78. Even the practice of some Justices to refrain from explaining their decision to with-
draw from participation in a case, and the practice of others to provide written explana-
tions of recusal decisions, reflects the kind of personal choice that governs the Justices'
conduct in this area.
79. See Tony Mauro, Souter Watch, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 3, 1990, at 15 (highlightingJustice
Souter as one of the majority ofJustices who regularly refuse to explain their recusal deci-
sions, and identifying Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor as the only members
of the Court who routinely disclose their reasons for recusal).
80. Id.
81. See Stempel, supra note 62, at 599 (describing the "strong traditions of deference
and good manners prevailing in Supreme Court practice" that may influence a litigant's
decision not to seek recusal of a Justice).
82. 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
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schools.8" At the time, some speculated that Tribe sought to provoke
the recusal of Justice Thomas without moving outright for the Justice's
recusal.8 4 Tribe strongly denied the suggestion. 5
In a more recent case, rather than formally move for disqualifica-
tion, the attorney for a man convicted and sentenced to death for the
murder of the father of Judge John Luttig of the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals faxed a letter to the clerk of the Court asking Justice
Thomas to recuse himself from the case.16 Justice Thomas's close per-
sonal relationship with Judge Luttig was revealed in an October 2000
New York Times Magazine article profiling Judge Luttig.87 The article
also described Luttig as a key figure in the confirmation of Justice
Souter to the Court. Justice Scalia, for whom Judge Luttig had served
as a law clerk, had already voluntarily recused himself from the case.
The lawyer for the death-row convict stated that he would file a mo-
tion for recusal against Justice Thomas if he received no response to
the letter."M Ultimately, Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas disquali-
fied themselves from participation in the decision to deny cert in that
case.89
In point of fact, there are no clear procedures for litigators who
seek to disqualify Supreme Court Justices-a fairly remarkable fact
given the complex set of rules and procedures that govern practice
before the Court. Stern and Gressman's Supreme Court Practice is the
"bible" for litigators in the Court. ° While the text provides detailed
instructions on the nuts and bolts of Supreme Court practice-from
how to prepare the joint appendix to be submitted to the Court to
how to address the Justices during oral argument-this nearly 1000
page litigation volume never even mentions recusal or disqualifica-
tion, let alone how to seek disqualification of a Justice." t In effect, a
lawyer who questions the impartiality of a Supreme Court Justice is
83. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 9 n.3, Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)
(No. 95-1773).
84. See Tony Mauro, Thomas Recusal?, LEGAL TIMES, May 20, 1996, at 9 (providing the
text of the footnote and suggesting it may be "in the university's interest not to have
Thomas voting in the case").
85. Id.
86. Jim Yardley & Raymond Bonner, Justice Thomas' Recusal Sought in Texas Death Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2001, at A13.
87. Jeffrey Rosen, The Next Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 74.
88. Yardley & Bonner, supra note 86.
89. Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir.), stay of execution denied, 533 U.S. 969
(2001), cert. denied sub nom. Beazley v. Cockrell, 122 S. Ct. 329 (2001).
90. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (7th ed. 1993).
91. Id. Other commentators have remarked on this curious fact as well. See, e.g., Stem-
pel, supra note 62, at 598 n.42.
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given no direction on how to prepare a challenge to ajustice's partici-
pation in the hearing of the case. The absence of specific procedures
for filing recusal motions to the Court implicitly discourages recusal
motions by suggesting that they are outside the realm of "regular" Su-
preme Court practice. It also reinforces the notion that the Justices
themselves, rather than litigants, are expected to take the lead in initi-
ating recusal practices.
Indeed, in 1993, seven members of the Court collectively took the
lead and created a uniform recusal policy for one category of cases.
Released as a press statement, the Justices' 1993 "Statement of Recusal
Policy" set out a procedure by which Justices would disqualify them-
selves from hearing cases in which their relatives are partners in firms
appearing before the Court.92 The recusal requirements for these
kinds of cases are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (5) (ii). 3 In the
Statement, the Justices announced that they would recuse themselves
from cases in which their relatives are partners in law firms appearing
before the Court "unless we have received from the firm written assur-
ance that income from Supreme Court litigation is, on a permanent
basis, excluded from our relatives' partnership shares."94 The word-
ing of the Statement suggests that the opposite would also be true-
92. Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 62. Justices Souter and Blackmun did not
sign the Recusal Policy.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2000) provides that in addition to instances in which ajudge's
"impartiality might reasonably be questioned," as set out in § 455(a), a judge must also
recuse him or herself:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or
a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as
a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material
witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity par-
ticipated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in contro-
versy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either
of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
94. Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 62, at 2.
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that in cases in which the Court has received such written assurances
from their relatives' law firms, the Justices will participate in deciding
cases involving those law firms.
95
In the Statement, the Justices re-emphasized their negative view
of recusal in cases where actual bias is not at issue:
We do not think it would serve the public interest to go be-
yond the requirements of the statute, and to recuse our-
selves, out of an excess of caution, whenever a relative is a
partner in the firm before us or acted as a lawyer at an earlier
state. Even one unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning
of the Court.96
The Justices highlighted the special problems of recusal on the Su-
preme Court "where the absence of one Justice cannot be made up by
another."97 They also raised the concern that lawyers might begin
"strategizing" recusals, and that the certiorari process may be
"distort[ed]. 98
While the adoption of this policy was in one sense an admirable
attempt to create a uniform and public standard for recusal of cases
involving § 455(b) (5), the Recusal Policy signals the Court's failure to
fully appreciate the scope of § 455 (a). The Justices' Recusal Policy
ignores the fact that a Justice's participation in a case in which a rela-
tive is a partner in a firm appearing before the Court may create the
appearance of bias even if the Justice's relative receives no share of the
financial benefits derived from the firm's Supreme Court practice. In
other words, the Statement of Recusal Policy fails to recognize the
potential § 455 (a) "appearance" problems raised by cases in which the
relatives of Justices are partners in law firms appearing before the
Court.
In fact, the Recusal Policy is directly at odds with the guidance
offered in the Commentary to Canon 3 of the Model Code. There,
the Committee on Ethics specifically cautions that although "[t]he
fact that a lawyer in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm ... does
not of itself disqualify the judge[,] . .. [u] nder appropriate circumstances,
the fact that 'the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned'... may
95. Such examples are discussed infra notes 101-116 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing ChiefJustice Rehnquist's decision not to recuse himself in the Microsoft case despite his
son's involvement); infta notes 117-125 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia's
involvement in Bush v. Gore and his son's partnership in the law firm that represented
George W. Bush in the election contest and protest litigation).
96. Statement of Recusal Policy, supra note 62, at 1.
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id.
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require the judge's disqualification."99 In essence, the Code explicitly calls
for § 455(b) determinations to be made in tandem with the require-
ments of § 455(a). By contrast, the Court's Recusal Policy takes
§ 455 (a) considerations out of its recusal evaluation of these cases.
In effect, the 1993 Recusal Policy constitutes the Court's blanket
and prejudged determination that a Justice's impartiality is not rea-
sonably questioned when a relative is a partner in a firm appearing
before the Court, so long as the Justice's relative receives no direct
financial benefit from the matter before the Court. Rather than ap-
plying an objective reasonable person standard on a case-by-case basis,
as § 455(a) requires,' the Recusal Policy simply reflects the justices'
own sense of what to them would constitute a reasonable basis upon
which to question a judge's impartiality and applies that standard
across the board.
In September 2000, Chief Justice Rehnquist had occasion to fur-
ther clarify the Court's Recusal Policy and its relationship to § 455 (a)
determinations. In Microsoft v. United States,'' ChiefJustice Rehnquist
issued a statement explaining his decision not to withdraw from the
decision in that case, even though his son James defended Microsoft
in a variety of private antitrust matters.0 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist's
decision not to recuse himself in Microsoft drew criticism from some
prominent legal ethics experts. 10 3 His forthright disclosure of the is-
sue and direct and public statement explaining the rationale behind
his decision not to recuse himself drew praise from others.10 4
In a statement explaining his decision in Microsoft, Chief Justice
Rehnquist provided an analysis of recusal under both § 455(a) and
(b) 10 5 that reveals how the Court has failed to appropriately integrate
a rigorous § 455 (a) analysis into its Recusal Policy. In his statement in
99. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1) (d) cmt. (2000) (emphasis ad-
ded). In fact, years earlier the ABA had adopted the more stringent position that "an
equity partner in a law firm generally has 'an interest that could be substantially affected by
the outcome of the proceeding in all cases where the law firm represents a party before the
court."' ABA Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 58 (1978) (revised 1998). The
Code does not contain such a strict interpretation of Canon 3, but the Commentary clearly
suggests that the Committee intended forjudges to exercise caution in these cases and to
consider the "appearance" or 3(E) implications of recusal.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2000).
101. 530 U.S. 1301 (2000) (order denying appeal).
102. Id. at 1301-03.
103. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Rehnquist Won't Bow Out: Refusal to Recuse in Microsoft, LEGAL
TIMES, Oct. 2, 2000, at 12 (noting that Professor Stephen Gillers, a legal ethics expert,
concluded that Chief Justice Rehnquist should have recused himself from the Microsoft
case).
104. See id. (reporting the comments of judicial ethics expert Professor Steven Lubet).
105. Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1302.
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Microsoft, the Chief Justice determined that § 455(b) (5) (iii), which
governs recusal in cases in which a relative of ajudge "[i]s known ...
to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome
of the proceeding," 116 did not compel his recusal from hearing the
Microsoft case. He concluded that "there is no reasonable basis to con-
clude that the interests of my son or his law firm will be substantially
affected by the proceedings currently before the Supreme Court."1 0 7
Rehnquist appears to have based this conclusion, in part, on the un-
remarkable fact that "Microsoft has retained Goodwin, Procter &
Hoar on an hourly basis at the firm's usual rates."'0 8 In a particularly
revealing passage, Rehnquist stated, "[e]ven assuming that my son's non-
pecuniary interests are relevant under the statute [28 U.S.C. § 455], it would
be unreasonable and speculative to conclude that the outcome of any
Microsoft proceeding in this Court would have an impact on those
interests . . . .""' What is striking about this statement is that it reveals
the Chief Justice's skeptical view about the relevance of nonpecuniary
interests to recusal determinations-interests clearly relevant to an
evaluation of recusal under § 455(a). Rehnquist's skepticism in this
regard is further revealed in his brief discussion of § 455 (a), which he
determined also did not compel his recusal from the Microsoft case.
His explanation was simple:
I have already explained that my son's personal and financial
concerns will not be affected by our disposition of the Su-
preme Court's Microsoft matters. Therefore, I do not be-
lieve that a well-informed individual would conclude than an
appearance of impropriety exists simply because my son rep-
resents, in another case, a party that is also a party to litiga-
tion pending in this Court. °
Chief Justice Rehnquist's summary analysis and explanation of why
recusal is not warranted by § 455 (a) is deeply flawed. It seems quite
clear that the disposition of the federal government's mammoth anti-
trust case against Microsoft could well have an effect on smaller pri-
vate antitrust cases against the computer giant. As Stephen Gillers
notes, "[p] rivate antitrust litigation involving Microsoft would almost
certainly be influenced by the outcome of the government's case
against the software giant." '111 Indeed Rehnquist himself conceded
106. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(iii) (1994)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id.
111. Mauro, supra note 103.
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that "[a] decision by this Court as to Microsoft's antitrust liability
could have a significant effect on Microsoft's exposure to antitrust
suits in other courts."' 12 Certainly a reasonable, well-informed person
might conclude, as Professor Gillers did, that in light of that reality
Rehnquist "should step aside.""1 3
Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist brushed aside this fact with the fol-
lowing rationalization:
[B]y virtue of this Court's position atop the Federal Judici-
ary, the impact of many of our decisions is often quite broad.
The fact that our disposition of the pending Microsoft litiga-
tion could potentially affect Microsoft's exposure to antitrust
liability in other litigation does not, to my mind, significantly
distinguish the present situation from other cases that this
Court decides. Even our most unremarkable decision inter-
preting an obscure federal regulation might have a signifi-
cant impact on the clients of our children who practice
law.1 14
Ultimately, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "[g] iving such a
broad sweep to § 455(a) seems contrary to the 'reasonable person'
standard which it embraces." '115 Yet Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis
appears to strip § 455(a) of the power to impose recusal on Supreme
Court Justices in cases in which the interests of their lawyer-relatives'
clients might be affected by disposition of pending Supreme Court
litigation. Under the ChiefJustice's reasoning in Microsoft, one might
well conclude that Supreme Court Justices need never disqualify them-
selves from cases in which their relatives are lawyers for parties appear-
ing before the Court, so long as no direct financial interests are at
stake. Giving such a narrow sweep to § 455 (a) would seem at odds not
only with the "reasonable person" perspective from which § 455 (a)
questions are to be evaluated, but also with Congress's express "con-
cern[ ] with the 'appearance' of impropriety. "116
112. Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1302.
113. Tony Mauro, Rehnquist to Participate in Microsoft Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept.
27, 2000, at 4 (quoting Stephen Gillers).
114. Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1302-03.
115. d. at 1303.
116. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisitions Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 872 (1988).
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II. THE APPEARANCE OF JUDICIAL BIAS ON THE SUPREME COURT IN
BusH v. GORE
A. Justice Scalia and the Appearance of Bias
1. The Lawyer/Relative Question.-The conflict between the
Court's 1993 Statement of Recusal Policy and § 455(a) was tested by
Justice Scalia's participation in Bush v. Gore. In the days immediately
prior to the second oral argument in Bush v. Gore, several newspapers
reported for the first time that one of Justice Scalia's sons, Eugene
Scalia, was a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, the law firm repre-
senting George W. Bush in the election contest and protest
litigation."17
Expert opinions on whether Justice Scalia should have disquali-
fied himself from hearing the case concluded, for the most part, that
no real conflict existed."1 ' References were made to the Court's 1993
Statement of Recusal Policy for handling cases in which a relative of a
sitting Justice is employed by a law firm appearing before the Court.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher apparently had provided a written assur-
ance to the Court that Eugene Scalia would receive no partnership
benefits from Supreme Court cases.1 19 Justice Scalia did not recuse
himself from participating in Bush v. Gore. In fact, Justice Scalia took
on a leadership role in granting candidate Bush's request to stop the
recount, and in deciding the election in favor of candidate Bush.1 20
Scalia's participation in Bush v. Gore exposes the clear conflict between
the Court's 1993 self-created Statement of Recusal Policy and the obli-
gations imposed by § 455(a).
117. See, e.g., Woodward & Lane, supra note 10. Another of Justice Scalia's sons was an
associate in yet another firm that formed part of the Bush legal defense. I focus on the bias
issue raised by Eugene Scalia's partnership in Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
118. See Jackson, supra note 10 (quoting Stephen Gillers, who concluded that Justice
Scalia was not required to recuse himself). But see Democrat Urges Scalia to Bow Out of Florida
Case, supra note 11 (quoting Lanny Davis, former special counsel to President Clinton, who
suggested that Scalia should explain "why recusal, at least for appearances' sake, isn't
desirable").
119. See Mauro, supra note 103 (describing Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher's "elaborate pro-
cedures ... developed to ensure that [Eugene Scalia] does not benefit monetarily from the
firm's Supreme Court practice").
120. Justice Scalia wrote the widely criticized decision explaining the majority's decision
to stop the recount. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring) (2000). For
an analysis of Justice Scalia's leadership role in deciding Bush v. Gore, see Woodward &
Lane, supra note 10. For a critique of Justice Scalia's stay decision and leadership role in
Bush v. Gore, see GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 124-25; RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE
DEADLOCK THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 166-67 (2001);
Strauss, supra note 14, at 189-91.
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In the context of Bush v. Gore, a reasonable person, and certainly
Vice President Gore, might well have believed that Justice Scalia
would be favorably inclined towards the client of the firm where his
son was a partner-particularly in a case of the magnitude, contro-
versy, and partisan nature of Bush v. Gore. Yet, the 1993 Statement and
Justice Scalia ignored this potential reality.
Justice Scalia's participation in Bush v. Gore reveals the flawed rea-
soning behind the Court's decision to premise its recusal policy in
cases involving relatives who are partners in law firms appearing
before the Court on whether the lawyer/relative stands to gain part-
nership profits from Supreme Court litigation. The policy takes no
account of the prestige benefit of winning a case in the Supreme
Court-especially a controversial case. The principal benefit to the
firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher of taking and winning Bush v. Gore
was reputational rather than financial. The entire firm of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher received this benefit.121 For example, in naming
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher one of the top five law firms in Los Angeles,
Corporate Board Member Magazine noted that "Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
may have done best in terms of prestige. The firm took on the Su-
preme Court case [ ] of Bush v. Gore... arguing for the plaintiff-cum-
president.' 22 Ensuring that Eugene Scalia would not receive a por-
tion of the fees derived from the firm's Supreme Court practice would
not prevent the younger Scalia from receiving the reputational benefit
that would attach to all of the firm's partners if Bush prevailed in the
litigation. 123
121. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher may also have made a different, more long-term calcula-
tion in its decision to represent candidate Bush. Lawyers at the firm may have reasonably
concluded that a Bush win would be financially beneficial to the firm as many of the poli-
cies advanced by Bush during his campaign might, if put into practice, benefit several of
Gibson, Dunn's major clients. For example, Bush's controversial campaign support for the
creation of a national missile defense system might, if enacted, benefit defense contractor
Northrop, Grumman, one of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher's Los Angeles clients. See
www.gibsondunn.com/Recruitment/brochure.oppabound-p05.html (last visited May 14,
2002) (listing Northrop Grunmann as a Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher client). In this regard,
all of Gibson, Dunn's partners may have stood to gain from a Bush win.
122. Thomas Horton, Leaders in 50 Metro Areas: Los Angeles, CORP. BOARD MEMBER, Spe-
cial Legal Issue 2001, available at http://www.boardmember.com/issues/2001_LAW.
123. For example, potential clients, learning that this is the firm that "won" Bush v. Gore,
might be favorably inclined to hire the lawyers at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. Eugene Scalia
was recently nominated by President Bush to serve as the Solicitor for the Department of
Labor, the top lawyer charged with managing what has been described as the second-larg-
est legal department in the federal government. Cindy Skrzycki, Labor Choice Decried Ergo-
nomics Rule, WASH. PosT, June 12, 2001, at El. While President Bush no doubt would have
nominated Scalia-a well known conservative labor lawyer-to the post whether or not
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher were the law firm that represented him in Bush v. Gore, it is also
true that it was easy to predict that if Al Gore had become President he would not have
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In sum, the Court's method of dealing with cases in which rela-
tives are partners in law firms appearing before the Court does not
adequately address the appearance of conflict in Bush v. Gore. A seri-
ous and careful § 455(a) evaluation might well have compelled Justice
Scalia to disqualify himself from hearing the case to avoid the appear-
ance of bias. The blanket nature of the Recusal Policy, and Justice
Scalia's apparent determination that not even the unique and criti-
cally important case of Bush v. Gore warranted a departure from the
policy,1 24 demonstrates the Court's failure, refusal, or inability to
properly and consistently submit to the requirements of § 455(a). 25
2. Additional Grounds for Appearance of Bias Concerns.-There are
additional reasons that Justice Scalia's participation in Bush v. Gore
might have raised the appearance of bias. On several occasions dur-
ing the presidential campaign, then-candidate Bush expressed his ad-
miration forJustices Scalia and Thomas. Indeed the candidates' views
nominated Eugene Scalia to the Labor post, or any other post in his administration. Given
this reality, a reasonable person could conclude that the Scalias had an interest in the
outcome of the election-one that cannot be measured in purely financial terms. In fact,
although Eugene Scalia will take a pay cut as he moves from partnership in a large law firm
to this public sector job, he was reportedly "honored and pleased" to accept President
Bush's invitation to this prestigious post. Clearly, financial gain is not the only, or even the
best way to measure a lawyer's professional interests.
124. As Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized in Bush v. Gore, "[w]e deal here not with an
ordinary election, but with an election for President of the United States." 531 U.S. 98, 112
(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
125. Of course, presuming thatJustice Scalia would be favorably predisposed to his son's
firm assumes that both father and son enjoy a positive and supportive relationship. It is
certainly not outside the realm of possibility for a father to have no desire to assist or
promote the professional interests of his son. But certainly in the absence of an assertion
to the contrary, a reasonable person might justifiably assume that Justice Scalia would be
pleased by the success of his son's firm in the highest profile case to come to the Court in
decades. Indeed, such an assumption is implicit in the disqualification language of Canon
3(E) of the Model Code and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (5), prohibiting a judge from hearing a
case in which a spouse or person within the third degree of relationship to either of them
acts as a lawyer in the case or "[i]s known by the judge to have an interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) (5) (iii)
(2000). The Model Code's language is slightly different, prohibiting ajudge from hearing
a case in which a spouse or someone within the third degree of relationship to either of
them "is known by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the proceeding." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
3(E) (i) (d) (iii) (2000).
And, of course, both the Model Code and § 455 express not only a concern with actual
bias, but express equally the importance of judges avoiding the appearance of bias. MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). One need not presume,
therefore, thatJustice Scalia actually would be so unprofessional as to put a personal inter-
est in his son's professional advancement above the rule of law. Instead, the relevant ques-
tion is whether a "reasonable person" might conclude, based on the facts set out above,
that a Justice might be so inclined.
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on the Justices became a key campaign issue. At one point, candidate
Bush stated that if he had the opportunity to nominate ajustice to the
Supreme Court, he would nominate aJustice like Justice Scalia orJus-
tice Thomas, both of whom he held up as his judicial role models. 126
Certainly, the mere fact that a presidential candidate speaks highly of
the work of a judge before whom he later appears as a party is not in
and of itself sufficient grounds for recusal.127 But in this case, the
nature of Bush's comments could have had two more significant
meanings for Justice Scalia that raise appearance of bias concerns.
First, although any judge would be gratified to hear an executive
promise to appoint like-minded judges to sit on the same bench, for a
judge on a court as ideologically split as the current Supreme Court, a
promise such as that offered by then-candidate Bush had special sig-
nificance. In real terms, the appointment of Justices to the High
Court who share the views of Justices Scalia and Thomas would result
in an even stronger lurch to the right in a variety of highly controver-
sial cases-cases in which Justices Scalia and Thomas have to date
been unable to garner a majority for their often extreme and uncom-
promising interpretation of important constitutional questions. 128
For example, if Justices O'Connor and Stevens resigned from the
bench and were replaced on the Court by Justices with views more
closely aligned with those of Justice Scalia, many argue that Roe v.
Wade might well be overturned.129 To the extent that Justice Scalia,
126. David G. Savage, Supreme Stumpers: The Next President Could Reshape the Court and the
Legal Arena, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2000, at 26, 26.
127. But see Spires v. Hearst Corp., 420 F. Supp. 304 (C.D. Cal. 1976). In Spires, a district
court judge granted a recusal motion filed by employees of the Los Angeles Herald based on
the fact that, prior to discovery in the case, the paper wrote a flattering profile of the judge.
Id. at 307. Apparently, "there was no newsworthy event in which the judge was involved
that explained or justified the Paper's decision to profile the judge at all or at that time."
Hellman, supra note 47, at 660. The judge concluded that his impartiality "might reasona-
bly be questioned." Spires, 420 F. Supp. at 307.
128. As Frank Michelman has noted, "Justices of an ideologically charged and divided
Court have ideologically self-serving reasons to wish their ideological allies in a position to
control the coming composition of the Court." Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New
Prince, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 14, at 123, 133.
129. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (contending that the right to an abortion is not a constitution-
ally protected liberty). The possibility of such a shift on the Court is discussed in Rosen,
supra note 87. Vice President Gore remarked on the effect of Supreme Court appoint-
ments on the survival of Roe v. Wade frequently during the campaign. See Stewart M. Pow-
ell, Gore Lambastes Two Justices as Bush's Models to Fill Vacancies, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.),
June 29, 2000, at AlO (describing a Gore speech in the Midwest in which Gore warned that
the result of the presidential election may influence a woman's right to choose); see also
Savage, supra note 126, at 26 (quoting Gore as saying "[t]he last thing this country needs is
a Supreme Court that overturns Roe v. Wade").
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like most judges, would strongly prefer to have his strong and sin-
cerely held views prevail in majority decisions, rather than languish in
dissent, Bush's campaign promise may have given Justice Scalia an in-
terest in the outcome of the presidential election.' ° Even if Justice
Scalia did not develop a bias in favor of Bush as a result of the candi-
date's praise for Scalia's jurisprudence, Bush's remarks may have
given a reasonable person cause to question Scalia's impartiality in a
case in which the Justice would help determine the outcome of the
presidential election.
Indeed, Vice President Gore's negative comments about Justice
Scalia might also cause a reasonable person to question the Justice's
impartiality toward the Vice President. In counter to candidate Bush,
during the campaign candidate Gore strongly criticized Justices Scalia
and Thomas, calling their dissent in the case upholding the legality of
partial birth abortion "bitter in tone and divisive in nature."'' The
Vice President also reportedly referred to another of Justice Scalia's
dissents as "a particularly convoluted bit of logic."' 32 Moreover, candi-
date Gore challenged Bush's promise to name judges to the Court
like Justices Scalia and Thomas in the October 3, 2000 presidential
debate:
[W]hen the names of Scalia and Thomas are used as
benchmarks for who would be appointed, those are code
words, and nobody should mistake this, for saying that the
governor would appoint people who would overturn Roe v.
Wade. I mean, it's very clear to me. And I would appoint
people who have a philosophy that I think would make it
quite likely that they would uphold Roe v. Wade.' 33
Gore reportedly named Justices Thurgood Marshall and William
Brennan as his judicial role models.13 1
For the same reasons that candidate Bush's campaign statements
praising Justices Scalia and Thomas's jurisprudence might have cre-
ated the appearance of bias in favor of Bush, so too candidate Gore's
strong statements criticizing Justices Scalia and Thomas might cause a
reasonable person to think that Justice Scalia was biased against the
Vice President.
130. SeePosner, supra note 44, at 18 (noting thatjudges "even on the Supreme Court...
obtain satisfaction from casting votes that are not merely symbolic expressions, but
count").
131. Powell, supra note 129.
132. Id.
133. Election 2000 Presidential Debates, Oct. 3, 2000, available at http://www.c-
span.org/campaign2000/transcript/debate-I00300.asp.
134. Savage, supra note 126, at 26.
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Bush's campaign flattery of Justice Scalia may have undermined
the appearance of Justice Scalia's impartiality in another way. Some
commentators speculated at the time of his comments that candidate
Bush was indicating implicitly his intention to elevate Justice Scalia to
the position of Chief Justice when Chief Justice Rehnquist steps
down.' 35 A Bush electoral victory could theoretically pave the way for
Justice Scalia to advance to the highest level of professional achieve-
ment for any judge, that of ChiefJustice of the United States. 3 6 That
an opportunity to become Chief Justice might, even unconsciously,
affect a judge's decision-making is not far-fetched. As some studies
have revealed, judges are conscious of how their decision-making af-
fects their career advancement. 137 In any case, § 455 and the Model
Code are not concerned solely with whether a judge would in fact act
on such a personal interest. Instead § 455 and the Model Code are
focused on whether a litigant-in this case Vice President Gore-
might reasonably believe that Justice Scalia might be, even uncon-
sciously, motivated by such a concern. I contend that such a belief is
reasonable.
B. Justice O'Connor and the Appearance of Bias
According to several published reports, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor had a very particular interest in the outcome of the elec-
tion. 138 It was reported that at an election night dinner attended by
close friends, Justice O'Connor remarked "[t] his is terrible" when sev-
eral television news reports declared Gore the likely winner of the
election.' 39 According to the report, when Justice O'Connor left the
room, her husband explained that she was distressed by the possibility
of Gore winning the election because she wanted to retire, and would
only do so under a Republican president in order to ensure that a
Republican would appoint her successor.' 4 ' If this account and the
135. See, e.g., Wayne Woodlief, In the Supreme Court of Public Opinion, BOSTON HERALD,
May 28, 2000, at 29.
136. I am grateful to Mark Rahdert, Associate Dean at Temple University, for raising this
point during a discussion of Bush v. Gore at the Temple Political and Civil Rights Law
Review's 2001 Symposium on "Constructive Disenfranchisement." See Symposium, Con-
structive Disenfranchisement: The Problems of Access and Ambiguity Facing the American Voter, 11
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
137. See Posner, supra note 44, at 5 (suggesting that the potential appointment of federal
court of appeals judges to the Supreme Court figures in the thinking of some judges).
138. See, e.g., Evan Thomas & Michael Isikoff, The Truth Behind the Pillars, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 25, 2000, at 46, 46 (reporting Justice O'Connor's reaction to early reports on the
outcome of the election).
139. Id.
140. Id.
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explanation offered by Justice O'Connor's husband are true, then Jus-
tice O'Connor expressed a personal interest in the outcome of the
election from which a reasonable person might question her imparti-
ality in Bush v. Gore.
Of course, all active and concerned voters-including presuma-
bly judges-may feel a personal interest in the outcome of a presiden-
tial election. But the interest reportedly expressed by Justice
O'Connor extends beyond the mere desire of a partisan to see "her
candidate" or political party prevail. Instead, Justice O'Connor's in-
tention to coordinate her long-desired retirement with the election of
a Republican president reveals a more direct interest-indeed a per-
sonal bias-towards Republican candidate Bush. While in general
judges are not prevented from having a strong and personally felt bias
in favor of a particular presidential candidate, such a bias was deeply
problematic for a Justice sitting on a sharply divided Court whose de-
cision would constitute the last word on the outcome of the election.
In his recent book, Too Close to Call, Jeffrey Toobin relates a story
that, if accurate, suggests a shocking level of bias by Justice
O'Connor.1" 1 According to Toobin's sources, Justice O'Connor com-
mented on what she called the "outrageous" actions of "those Gore
people," whom she accused of going "into a nursing home and regis-
ter[ing] people that they shouldn't have." 4 As the legality of voter
registration methods was not among the factual or legal issues
presented in Bush v. Gore, Justice O'Connor could only have gleaned
this information from newspaper accounts or from rumor. In fact,
Toobin notes that this story was one that "had circulated only in the
more eccentric right-wing outlets."1 43 If Toobin's account of Justice
O'Connor's remarks on December 4 is true, then she was biased
against Gore based on unproven accusations of actions she attributed
to the candidate. As such, Justice O'Connor should not have partici-
pated in the hearing or decisions in Bush v. Gore at the Supreme
Court.
C. Justice Thomas and the Appearance of Bias
In November and December 2000, Virginia Lamp Thomas, wife
of Justice Clarence Thomas, was actively engaged on behalf of the
conservative Heritage Foundation in soliciting resumes for candidates
to fill key positions in the possible Bush administration. 44 The Heri-
141. TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 248-49.
142. Id. at 248.
143. Id. at 249.
144. Marquis, supra note 10.
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tage Foundation is an influential conservative think-tank where Mrs.
Lamp Thomas was employed as a senior fellow.'45 After allegations of
bias appeared in several newspapers, representatives of the Heritage
Foundation explained that the "head-hunting" work of Mrs. Lamp
Thomas was "designed to help the next president, whoever he may be,
to organize an effective administration."'46
On its face, the Heritage Foundation's explanation adequately
answers concerns about bias. The Foundation had no (publicly
known) official role in the Bush campaign or transition. Instead, the
Foundation performed a task that was consistent with its interests and
concerns and theoretically could assist either presidential candidate in
organizing his administration. Certainly a Gore administration would
be free to select from among resumes collected by the Foundation in
its search for competent candidates to fill important governmental po-
sitions. In reality, of course, the likelihood that Vice President Gore
would utilize the head-hunting services of the Heritage Foundation is
as remote as the likelihood that President Bush would utilize similar
services if they were offered by the NAACP or the Sierra Club. Cer-
tainly Mrs. Lamp Thomas's solicitation efforts would more likely yield
success in a Bush presidency. Nevertheless, the mere fact that one
candidate's proclivities would make them more inclined to look favor-
ably on resumes collected by the employer of a Justice's wife does not
give rise to actual bias or even a reasonable appearance of bias.
Reasonable persons, including the Vice President, may have had
reason to question Justice Thomas's impartiality for other reasons,
however. First, like Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas was singled-out by
candidate Bush during the campaign as an example of the kind of
Justice he would appoint to the Supreme Court.'47 While there is lit-
tle chance that Justice Thomas could have read into those remarks a
promise of being appointed as Chief Justice during the Bush presi-
dency,' 48 justice Thomas, like justice Scalia, would benefit from shar-
ing the bench with like-minded judges. One need only read Justice
Thomas's passionate concurrences in cases like Holder v. Hall,4 ' to
understand how deeply felt and extreme some of his views are. 5 °
145. Id.
146. Jackson, supra note 10.
147. Savage, supra note 126, at 26.
148. Justice Thomas is among the three most junior members of the Court and would
not likely be selected as Chief Justice over more senior members of the conservative wing
of the Court.
149. 512 U.S. 874, 891 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. In Holder, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, advocated the dismantling of
twenty-five years of the Court's jurisprudence in voting rights cases. Ironically, Justice
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When Bush promised to appoint Justices like Scalia and Thomas, he
signaled his commitment to provide Justice Thomas with support for
his ideologically extreme views.
There may have been yet another reason to question Justice
Thomas's impartiality in Bush v. Gore. In his recently published book
exploring the election crisis of 2000, author and lawyerJeffrey Toobin
contends that Justice Thomas invited arch-conservative columnist
George Will as his personal guest to hear the December 1 oral argu-
ment in Bush v. Gore, ensuring the columnist access to a highly coveted
seat in the courtroom."' 1 If Toobin's allegation is true, then
Thomas's actions could create "in reasonable minds a perception" 52
that his impartiality was compromised.
George F. Will is a well-known and unrelentingly conservative col-
umnist and television commentator. He appears weekly on This
Week-an ABC News show that focuses on issues of government, and
his column appears several times a week in major daily newspapers.1 5 '
Between November 7 and December 1 when Bush v. Gore first came
before the Supreme Court for oral argument, columnist Will wrote
nearly a dozen articles about the election controversy. In each, Will
excoriated Vice President Gore's attempt to obtain a recount in sev-
eral counties in Florida, disparaged any decision from the Florida Su-
preme Court that favored candidate Gore, and regularly condemned
the Democratic Party. 54 Will described Gore as having a "corrupting
Thomas argued that the Court's decisions supporting the idea that diluting the vote of
minorities denies equal voting rights have so engaged the courts in an "inherently political
task" that "the preservation of 'the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process'" is
threatened, id. at 936-37 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)), a claim
that might be more appropriately applied to the Court's actions in Bush v. Gore. Thus,
Justice Thomas's concurrence imagines a world in which the progress made by blacks and
other minorities in the political process-largely as a result of the Court's decisions over
twenty-five years upholding Congress's prohibition against vote dilution in the Voting
Rights Act-would be dismantled.
151. TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 214.
152. MODEL CODE OF JUDIcIAL CONDuCT Canon 2(A) cmt. (2000). The Model Code
Commentary states that "[t]he test for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct
would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial
responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired." Id.
153. It is important to note that Will is not a journalist-one whose job is to impartially
report the news. Will is an opinion columnist. His popularity stems from his strongly-held
conservative beliefs, which he advances in columns containing stinging barbs and caustic
put-downs of Democrats, liberals, and occasionally even moderate Republicans.
154. See, e.g., George F. Will, Gore, Hungy for Power, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2000, at B7
(editorializing that "the Clinton-Gore era culminates with an election as stained as the blue
dress [and) a Democratic chorus complaining that the Constitution should not be the
controlling legal authority ...").
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hunger for power" and as engaging in "serial mendacity. '1 55 In a par-
ticularly vicious slap at Gore's campaign manager, Will described Wil-
liam Daley as one "for whom the manufacturing (literally the making
by hand) of votes is a family tradition." '156 Will referred to the ballot
recount in Palm Beach as "slow-motion larceny."157 Will also accused
the Florida Supreme Court of "airily rewriting Florida's election law
and applying it retroactively to this election," 58 a view later advanced
by the three concurring Justices in Bush v. Gore--albeit in less flowery
terms.159 And in a column appearing just a few days prior to the oral
argument before the Supreme Court, Will predicted that "if the court
rules for Bush, this will be judicial intervention in defense of the pre-
rogatives of the two political branches of Florida's government ...
against Florida's rogue Supreme Court."' 6 ° Will then concluded by
arguing that the Court's intervention on behalf of Bush "would be an
appropriate end to an election in which the most important policy difference
between the candidates concerned the kind of judges they would nominate."'1
Ironically, Will's commentary zeroes in precisely on the reason
why Justice Thomas should have been concerned about the appear-
ance of his impartiality in Bush v. Gore, and why he should not have
invited George Will to the oral argument of the case. Given the cen-
trality of judicial philosophy and nominations as an issue in the presi-
dential election, as well as Governor Bush's specific identification of
Justice Thomas as a judicial role model, Justice Thomas should have
exercised special care to avoid both the reality and appearance of bias.
The Model Code warns thatjudges should "expect to be the subject of
constant public scrutiny."'62 As such, the Code reminds judges that
they must "accept restrictions on [their] conduct that might be viewed
as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and
willingly."16 3
155. Id.
156. George F. Will, Slow-Motion Larceny, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2000, at A43.
157. Id.
158. George F. Will, This Willful Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2000, at A43.
159. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (conclud-
ing that "the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida election laws impermis-
sibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required").
160. George F. Will, Florida's Rogue Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 2001, at A27. Justice
Thomas ultimately shared this view. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
("This inquiry does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the consti-
tutionally prescribed role of state legislatures.").
161. Will, supra note 160 (emphasis added).
162. MODEL CODE OFJUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. (2000).
163. Id.
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Rather than accepting this burden as the price of maintaining
public confidence in the judiciary, Justice Thomas (if Toobin is cor-
rect) personally invited a columnist who had unleashed a persistent
and venomous attack on Vice President Gore, the Florida Supreme
Court, and the Democratic Party, and who had opined in some detail
on precisely the issues that were to come before Justice Thomas. Of
course, it would be absurd to suggest that there was any cause and
effect relationship between George Will's columns and Justice
Thomas's decision in Bush v. Gore. No doubt Justice Thomas would
have reached the same conclusions and employed the same reasoning
in Bush v. Gore with or without the advance public relations support
offered by Will's columns. Yet here again, the issue is less actual bias,
and more the appearance of bias. Why-in the most high profile, parti-
san, and bitterly contested case of national import to reach the Court
in years-would a Justice not exercise special caution to ensure that
he did not give the impression that he had prejudged the case? Cer-
tainly the Model Code would seem to suggest that ajudge in any case,
let alone one of the magnitude of Bush v. Gore, should feel himself
obligated to exercise such a heightened level of care. By inviting a
well-known, highly visible, partisan columnist as his guest at the Bush
v. Gore argument, Justice Thomas did not exercise that level of care.
11. THE ATTEMPT TO RECUSE JUDGE NIKKI CLARK
Despite the strong potential sources of bias and the appearance
of bias among the three Supreme Court Justices described above,
neither candidate, nor any other litigant in the Bush v. Gore litigation,
sought the disqualification of any of the United States or Florida Su-
preme Court judges.
Instead, the only motion filed seeking the recusal of a judge in
the many iterations of the Bush v. Gore litigation was candidate Bush's
attempt to seek the disqualification of Florida trial court judge Nikki
Clark in a suit in which candidate Gore was not even a litigant. 64
That case-Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Board'65-was brought
by a Democratic activist against the election boards of Seminole and
Martin counties. 16 6 This suit was deemed by some "a potential time
bomb for Republicans."' 67 In both Martin and Seminole counties, Re-
publican voting activists had altered or added missing information re-
164. George LardnerJr. &James Grimaldi, Absentee Ballot Suit Worries Republicans, WASH.
POST, Dec. 1, 2000, at A25.
165. 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000).
166. Joe Follick, Gore's Hopes Rest on Key Lawsuit Witnesses, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 7, 2000, at 8.
167. Lardner & Grimaldi, supra note 164.
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quired by Florida state law-such as voter registration numbers-to
thousands of absentee ballots that had been submitted lacking the
necessary information to local election officials.1 6' Rather than re-
jecting the deficient absentee ballots outright, the election officials in
Seminole and Martin counties had permitted members of the Repub-
lican election apparatus to come in and furnish the correct or missing
information on the ballot envelopes. 16
9
That Republican officials engaged in these actions was uncontro-
verted. The sole issue before Judge Clark in Seminole County was
whether, as a result of these actions, those absentee ballots should be
declared invalid.1 70 Because the absentee ballots, like the majority of
those cast in Seminole and Martin counties, were cast for George
Bush, the rejection of those absentee ballots would have eliminated
Bush's narrow statewide victory in Florida and changed the outcome
of the national election.
17 1
On November 29, 2000, Governor Bush sought the removal of
Judge Clark from hearing the Martin and Seminole County absentee
ballot case. 17 2 In his recusal motion, Bush cited the fact that Judge
Clark had submitted her name to Florida Governor Jeb Bush-
George Bush's brother-for a vacant appellate judge seat, and Gover-
norJeb Bush, only a few weeks earlier, had not selected her.173 The
candidates' brief insisted "the Republican Party will not receive a fair
trial in this Court on account of the perceived bias of Your Honor."' 174
Bush and Cheney further argued that because, based on these facts,
they had "a well-founded fear that justice in [the] case may be over-
shadowed by the appearance of impropriety, Your Honor's disqualifica-
tion is necessary. '175 Judge Clark denied the motion.' 7 6 Undeterred,
168. Id.
169. Karla Schuster, Absentee Challenges Put to Test: 2 Judges Hear Suits Totaling 25,000
Votes, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Dec. 7, 2000, at 19A. Judge Terry Lewis presided
over the case in Martin County, whileJudge Nikki Clark was assigned to hear the compan-
ion case in Seminole County. Id.
170. Alicia Caldwell, Seminole Ballot Case Hinges on Remedy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 6,
2000, at 9A.
171. Lardner & Grimaldi, supra note 164.
172. George W. Bush and Richard Cheney's and the Republican Party of Florida's Sug-
gestion of Disqualification of Trial Judge, Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., No.
00-2816 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2000), available at http://www.c-span.org/campaign2000/
Florida/CV-00-2816j.pdf.
173. Id. 1 3.
174. Id 4.
175. Id. 1 6 (emphasis added).
176. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2816 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 29, 2000)
(order denying motion to disqualify), available at http://www.c-span.org/campaign2000/
Florida/CV-00-2816k.pdf.
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George Bush appealed to the Florida Court of Appeals, which also
promptly rejected the motion.' 77 Bush's attempt to recuse Judge
Clark is remarkable. It stands as the only attempt by either candidate
to outright disqualify ajudge from hearing one of the many cases that
made up the Bush v. Gore challenges.
Lawyers use the tool of recusal sparingly. A smart lawyer recog-
nizes that a failed recusal motion leaves that same attorney to litigate a
case before a judge whom the attorney has accused of bias and
prejudice. 17' As discussed earlier, judges are discouraged from grant-
ing them. 179 Bush's attempt to recuse Judge Clark is remarkable for
another reason: it seems patently clear that Bush had no legitimate
grounds upon which to seek Judge Clark's recusal.
By all credible accounts, the suggestion thatJudge Clark might be
biased against presidential candidate George Bush because she had
not been selected for an appellate judgeship by Governor Jeb Bush
was merely a pretext. 8 ° Instead, the real reason behind Bush's
recusal motion was likely premised on illegitimate grounds-Judge
Clark's race. As Jeffrey Toobin writes, the Bush team "moved to re-
cuse Nikki Clark because she was black-period." ''
Judge Clark enjoyed an excellent reputation as a fair, nonpartisan
judge.' In fact, candidate Bush's local lawyers in Tallahassee tried
unsuccessfully to convince the Bush legal team that they "had nothing
to fear" from Judge Clark.'83 There was no indication that the failure
of Governor Jeb Bush to appoint Judge Clark to the Court of Ap-
peals-a job Judge Clark applied for along with eight other candi-
dates-was controversial or a source of rancor for the Judge.' 84 In
fact, Judge Clark's sister, Kristin Clark Taylor, had reportedly worked
as the director of media relations for President George H.W. Bush in
177. TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 209.
178. See id. (explaining that a failed recusal motion may "poison a lawyer's relationship
with a judge from the beginning of a case").
179. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the institutional pressures that
discourage judges from recusing themselves).
180. See TooBiN, supra note 10, at 208 (stating that the reason the Bush lawyers gave for
Judge Clark's recusal was "absurd").
181. Id. at 209.
182. See Thomas Fitzgerald & Peter Nicholas, Circuit Judge a Democrat, But Nonpartisan in
the Courtroom, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 7, 2000, at A15; Donna Leinwand, Absentee Case
Judge Said to Be Fair, USA TODAY, Dec. 6, 2000, at 3A; see also TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 208;
David Von Drehle et al., In a Dark Hour, a Last Minute-Reprieve, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at
Al.
183. TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 208.
184. William Sherman, Ballot Tamper Suit a Wild Card, N.Y. DALY NEWS, Dec. 1, 2000, at
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the White House-a connection Judge Clark could have, but chose
not to bring up during her interview with Governor Jeb Bush for the
appellate court seat.' Yet Daryl Bristow, one of the Bush lawyers,
later described his fear that 'Judge Clark would have her own pres-
sures coming from her own constituencies that would be partisan in na-
ture .... There was too much at stake to ignore the issue."' 86 It seems
unquestionable that the "constituency" referred to by Bristow was ra-
cial. 87 Another of Bush's lawyers (who refused to participate in the
recusal motion against Judge Clark) candidly observed that Judge
Clark "was erroneously stereotyped by both sides .... She was a black
woman, so she was presumed to be liberal and pro-Gore, plus she had
been turned down byJeb Bush."' 8 8
Historically, white litigants have often sought the recusal of black
judges in cases involving race. In the most famous among these cases,
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542189 and Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell,'
African-American federal district courtjudges A. Leon Higginbotham
and Constance Baker Motley, respectively, examined and strongly re-
jected recusal motions which suggested that black judges are biased
on racial issues while white judges are not.' 9' Other minority judges
have rejected similar challenges.' 92 Their opinions have become the
standard for responding to recusal motions of this sort.
The slow, but steady increase of African-Americans on the bench
over the past thirty years"9 3 has done little to diminish challenges to
185. Von Drehle et al., supra note 182.
186. TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 209 (emphasis added).
187. Otherjudges appointed by Democrats had presided over aspects of the many Bush
v. Gore cases without challenge from Bush's lawyers.
188. Von Drehle et al., supra note 182.
189. 388 F. Supp. 155 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
190. 418 F. Supp. I (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
191. In Local Union 542, Judge Higgenbotham considered a motion by the defendants,
mostly white members of a union, to recuse the judge in a racial discrimination case after
the judge gave a speech before an association of black historians. 388 F. Supp. at 157.
Judge Higgenbotham exhaustively examined the "essence" of the complaint, which he said
boiled down to race. Id. at 162-63. Noting that judges of various race, ethnicity, and relig-
ion participated in church and community affairs while maintaining impartiality on the
bench, the court concluded defendants' motion had no merit. Id. at 180-81. In Blank,
Judge Motley rejected a recusal motion made in a sex discrimination suit based, in part, on
the judge's race, sex, and prior work in civil rights litigation. 418 F. Supp. at 4-5.
192. See LeRoy v. City of Houston, 592 F. Supp. 415, 416 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (denying
defendant's motion to recuse a black judge in a challenge to the city's allegedly discrimina-
tory election practice); see also Baker v. City of Detroit, 458 F. Supp. 374, 375 (E.D. Mich.
1978) (denying plaintiffs motion to disqualify a judge, based on the judge's association
with the city's mayor, in a suit by white police officers alleging racial discrimination).
193. See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, MILES TO Go: PROGRESS OF MINORITIES IN THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 9-10 (1998). According to a study conducted by the American Bar Association,
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the impartiality of black judges. In many cases, judicial nominations
and election contests have been characterized by suggestions that
black judges are incapable of judging cases impartially.194 Media re-
ports about high profile legal cases regularly identify the race of black
judges, but not that of white judges.1 95 Courts reviewing civil rights
challenges to the method of electing judges in the South have implic-
itly suggested that black judges elected from districts in which the
population is majority black will threaten the impartiality of the
bench.196 Bush's recusal motion in the Seminole and Martin County
case falls squarely within the unfortunate history of these race-based
recusal cases.
Of course, black judges may indeed bring particular perspectives
to the bench that reflect the unique historical and contemporary ex-
periences of racial minorities in the United States. There is little
doubt that black judges, like other black citizens, are influenced by
their racialized experiences.' 97 But the influence of these experiences
on judicial decision-making is no more illegitimate than the exper-
iences and perspectives of white judges or women judges on their de-
cision-making. As Judge Motley stated in Blank:
[I]f background or sex or race of each judge were, by defini-
tion, sufficient grounds for removal, no judge on this court
could hear this case, or many others, by virtue of the fact that
all of them were attorneys, of a sex, often with distinguished
law firm or public service backgrounds. 198
Indeed judicial diversity-whether racial, gender, or experiential-
enhances the quality of judicial decision-making.' 99
African-Americans constituted only 3.3% ofjudges on the nation's federal, state, and local
courts in 1994. Id. at 10. Over 90% of all federal appellate judges are white. Id. at 9.
194. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 869 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1071 (1994) (stating that the plaintiff's attempts to give
African-American voters an opportunity to elect candidates of their choice to the state trial
bench would undermine 'Judicial fairness" and create a "semblance of bias and favoritism
towards the parochial interests of a narrow constituency"). See generally Ifill, Judging the
Judges, supra note 26, at 112-19 (discussing impartiality and minority judges).
195. See, e.g., Lane, supra note 33 (discussing a dispute in the Sixth Circuit and identify-
ing "GOP-appointed members" and "African American" "Democratic appointees").
196. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 869.
197. See Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 388 F. Supp. 155, 163-65 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (con-
taining Judge Higginbotham's reflection on being a black judge); see also Ifill, Judging the
Judges, supra note 26, at 119-28 (discussing at length how race can influence judicial deci-
sion-making).
198. Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
199. Ifill, Judging the Judges, supra note 26, at 119.
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The race of ajudge alone is not a reasonable basis upon which to
question a judge's impartiality. Impartiality does not require and in-
deed could not require that judges surgically remove from their con-
sciousness the effect of their life experiences and values. As I have
argued in other contexts, diversity on the bench actually promotes
impartiality by ensuring both structural impartiality of the entire judi-
ciary as well as the individual impartiality of judges.2 °° To the extent
that the Bush recusal motion againstJudge Clark was premised on the
presumption thatJudge Clark's race (and perhaps gender) created an
appearance of bias, it was indefensible.2"1
Disturbing as it is to imagine, the Bush attorneys may have had
tactical reasons for filing and pursuing the unsupportable recusal mo-
tion against Judge Clark.2 °2 By charging her with bias, Bush's lawyers
200. Id.
201. The fact that two other black judges in the Bush v. Gore cases were not similarly
challenged by Bush's lawyers does not purge the recusal motion filed against Judge Clark
of its racial taint. Certainly two judges on the Florida Supreme Court-Leander Shaw and
Peggy Quince-are black and were also appointed by Democratic governors. See Spotlight
on Florida Supreme Court Justices, Court TV Online, Nov. 20, 2000, at http://www.courttv.com/
national/decision_2000/1 12000_justices.ap.html. Bush lawyers did not seek the recusal of
either of these judges. But Nikki Clark was the only black trialjudge assigned to hear one
of the election challenge cases. As a trial judge, she alone would determine the relevant
issues in the Seminole and Martin county cases. Unlike an appellate judge, she would not
sit as part of a multi-member deliberative body where her ostensibly race-based bias in
favor of candidate Gore would be mediated by white (and therefore impartial) colleagues.
This perspective is consistent with the outcome of voting rights challenges in judicial elec-
tions cases, in which the right of minority voters to seek representation on the appellate
bench was upheld, while similar attempts by minority voters to gain representation on the
trial judge bench were rejected. Compare Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056, 1064-65 (5th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Roemer v. Chisom, 488 U.S. 955 (1988) (holding that the at-
large election of Louisiana Supreme Court justices violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments), with League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 902 F.2d 293, 295
(5th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the extension of Chisom to the election of at-large trial judges).
202. Like all good lawyers, the attorneys in Bush v. Gore recognized the importance of
the trial judges in determining and shaping the factual issues that ultimately would come
before the state and federal appellate courts. Moreover, as Governor Bush's legal team
seemed to view the entire Florida Supreme Court as biased against them, there was little
reason to single out the two black judges from among the seven on the state supreme court
who, by virtue of having been appointed to the bench by a Democratic Governor, were
perceived by the Bush team as being biased in favor of A] Gore. See GILLMAN, supra note
39, at 68-69 (describing the Republican reaction to the Florida Supreme Court's decision
in Gore v. Har7is); see also TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 113 (noting that seven of the nine
Florida Supreme CourtJustices were chosen by Democratic governors). This was a strange
assumption to make about the Florida Supreme Court, and little of the factual history of
Bush v. Gore bears out the conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court was biased against
Bush. In fact, the Florida Supreme Court had ruled against A] Gore in two critically impor-
tant cases-the challenge to the use of the butterfly ballot in Palm Beach, Fladell v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2000), and the absentee ballots
cases in Seminole and Martin counties, in which the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
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may have simply wanted to put Judge Clark on notice. In a high pro-
file case like Bush v. Gore, where resolution of the issues in any of the
cases could have decided the outcome of the presidential election,
every judge must have been aware of the intense scrutiny by the me-
dia, political parties and candidates, the bench, and the bar.2 °3 In
such a case, any good judge would attempt to exercise tremendous
caution and care in every aspect of the cases before her. A motion
charging a judge with bias in this tense context would only heighten a
judge's sense of caution. UltimatelyJudge Clark denied the plaintiffs'
demand that the absentee ballots be discarded in Seminole--a decision
that was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court.2 4 While her decision
is certainly defensible, we may never know whether the Bush recusal
motion affected, even unconsciously, Judge Clark's decision-making.
Interestingly, after the Florida Supreme Court ordered the recount of
ballots, the task of supervising the recount reportedly fell to Judge
Clark.2"5 She declined to accept the remand,20 6 however, and the re-
count was supervised instead by Judge Terry Lewis until the Supreme
Court issued its stay of the recount on December 4, 2000.207
The attempt to recuse Judge Clark on the flimsiest grounds, par-
ticularly in light of the more compelling potential sources of disquali-
fication for several Justices on the Supreme Court, demonstrates that
§ 455 (a) recusal motions can be manipulated in ways that undermine
judicial impartiality by reinforcing a conception of partiality that
marginalizes African-American and other minority judges.20 8 In this
context the Court's potential leadership role in helping define the
appropriate parameters for § 455 (a) recusal determinations is particu-
larly important.
trial judges' denial of the plaintiffs' claims. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773
So. 2d 519, 524 (Fla. 2000). And Chief Judge Wells, also a Democratic appointee to the
bench, dissented from the Florida Supreme Court's order requiring the recount of ballots.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
203. See TOOBIN, supra note 10, at 125 (stating that Florida Supreme Court ChiefJustice
Wells realized the high level of scrutiny that the Florida Supreme Court would face).
204. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 524.
205. See TooBIN, supra note 10, at 240. According to Toobin, the Florida Supreme
Court directed Judge Sauls to supervise the recount, but he recused himself from further
proceedings. Id. Judge Clark was the next judge in line. Id
206. Id.
207. GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 119-22.
208. But seeJohn McIntyre, Court Rules Bias Law Can Be Applied to Judges, STAR Tm. (Min-
neapolis), Feb. 1, 1996, at 7B (describing a Minnesota judge's ruling that rules preventing
preemptory strikes of jurors based on race also apply to race-based judicial recusal
motions).
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IV. PROMOTING THE APPEARANCE OF IMPARTIALITY IN BUSH v. GORE
The conduct of several of the Justices in Bush v. Gore suggests that
judges cannot be counted on to recognize what kinds of connections
or conduct would cause a reasonable person to question their imparti-
ality, let alone take steps to ameliorate those concerns. How then
could the Justices on the Court have acted to promote the appearance
of impartiality as required by the Model Code and § 455(a)? Below, I
explore a variety of actions that could have been taken by Justices on
the Court to minimize actual bias and to avoid the appearance ofjudi-
cial bias in Bush v. Gore.
A. Limitations on the Candidates' Right to Seek Judicial Recusal
At the outset, it is important to recognize an important political
reality. In Bush v. Gore it was practically impossible for either candi-
date-litigant to openly seek the recusal of any of the Supreme Court
Justices, regardless of the appearance ofjudicial bias. Both candidates
sought the presidency. Because prior to Bush v. Gore the United States
Supreme Court enjoyed unparalleled public approval,2 °9 a presiden-
tial candidate who attacked the legitimacy of the High Court could
only imperil his own stature and credibility on the national and inter-
national stage, precisely at the moment that he was trying to vindicate
his entitlement to the presidency. This was an important political re-
ality of which the Justices and certainly the candidates must have been
aware during the pendency of Bush v. Gore.
As a result, any move to disqualify a Justice from participating in
Bush v. Gore would have had to come from the Justices themselves.
This reality should have prompted from the Justices an even more
vigilant check on the appearance of bias issue because the litigants
could not in effect vindicate this important due process interest on
their own behalf without causing irreparable harm to their reputation
and credibility as presidential candidates. Moreover, the Court's obli-
gation to publicly exercise particular care and attention to the appear-
ance of impartiality in Bush v. Gore was simply compelled by its
leadership role as the highest and most respected court in the nation.
In this role, the Court failed to seize a unique opportunity to demon-
209. In August 2000, the Supreme Court's approval rating was 62%. John C. Yoo, In
Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT, supra
note 14, at 223, 226.
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strate to the nation's judges the importance of § 455 (a) considera-
tions to promoting the integrity of the bench. 21 0
B. Abstention, Recusal, Disclosure, and Restraint
I contend that the Justices on the Court had before them four
options, each of which would have promoted a greater appearance of
impartiality in Bush v. Gore. First, the Court could have abstained from
taking the case in the first instance, and certainly could have refrained
from stopping the vote. This was clearly the option that many experts
assumed the Court would exercise.21' While many have argued that
the Court was compelled to take the case in order to avoid a constitu-
tional crisis, even stronger arguments can be made that the Constitu-
tion provides that such a crisis is appropriately resolved in the political
branches of government-not the Court.2 12 What the Court averted
by taking the case was an unpleasant, contentious, fiercely partisan,
prolonged political battle for the Presidency-the kind of battle
uniquely suited to Congress.213 Rather than averting a crisis, the
Court "saved" us from witnessing the more unattractive and messy as-
pects of democracy. 214 But this is quite different than a "constitu-
tional crisis." 2'5 Had this battle played out in Congress, those who
were perceived as acting against the nation's interest or acting in bad
faith would face voters in the next election who would be able to vent
their anger at the political process.216
Second, one or more of the Justices could have recused them-
selves from the case. The "rule of necessity" was not implicated in
210. The special vulnerability of minority judges to unfounded 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) chal-
lenges as demonstrated in Bush v. Gore further supports that this kind of leadership is
needed.
211. Michelman, supra note 128, at 131-35; see GILLMAN, supra note 39, at 96, 126-28
(citing experts' praise for the restraint shown in the Court's first Bush v. Gore decision and
experts' derision after its stay of recount).
212. See Samuel Issacharoff, Political Judgments, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SU-
PREME COURT, supra note 14, at 55, 71-73 (describing the statutory framework for state
legislatures and Congress to resolve contested presidential elections); see also GILLMAN,
supra note 39, at 192-96 (criticizing the premise that the political institutions would be
unable to resolve the dispute over the 2000 election).
213. See Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND
THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 14, at 38, 50 (describing Congress as "the politically ac-
countable branch of government and the branch most likely to reflect the political judg-
ment of America's citizens").
214. See id. at 52 (noting that if the election came before Congress, then some of the
rhetoric there "would surely have appeared extreme and unreasonable").
215. Id. at 49-50.
216. Id. at 39-40; Michelman, supra note 128, at 133.
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Bush v. Gore.2 17 The withdrawal of one or two of the Justices from
hearing Bush v. Gore would still have left the remainder of the Justices
free to hear and decide the case. Two or more Supreme Court Jus-
tices recused themselves from participating in the hearing or determi-
nation of several cases during the 2000-2001 Term.21 8
And there are a variety of ways to address the concerns raised by
Justices on the Court about the effect of recusal on Supreme Court
practice. For example, one scholar has noted that the potential injus-
tice caused by increasing the burden on parties seeking certiorari is
caused by the Supreme Court's self-created policy of requiring four
votes to grant cert.2 19 Nothing in the Constitution or in any federal
statute mandates the four-vote cert rule.2 2 ° The Supreme Court is at
liberty to reduce the number of votes needed for cert in cases where
Justices recuse themselves from cert decisions.2 21 Likewise, concerns
about lawyers "strategizing" recusal can also be addressed. For exam-
ple, in a case ironically involving Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the law firm as appellate
counsel from a bankruptcy case after the court determined that the
party's retention of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher as their appellate coun-
sel drew into question the ability of one of the judges on the panel,
Judge Robert Sack, to decide the case impartially.2 2 2 The court noted,
"[i] t cannot have escaped the notice of the Gibson, Dunn firm and its
several partners that one of the members of this Court's panel.., was
a member of that firm from 1986 until 1998. "1223 The Supreme Court
217. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (discussing the common law Rule of
Necessity).
218. A Lexis search conducted on April 30, 2002, revealed at least 75 instances in which
the Court announced that one or more Justices "took no part" in decisions during the
October 2000-June 2001 Term. Between 1992 and 1995, there were 376 instances in which
"one or more Justices 'took no part'" in a decision from the Court. Stephen Lubet, Dis-
qualification of Supreme Court Justices: The Certiorari Conundrum, 80 MINN. L. REv. 657, 659
n.14 (1996). In August 2001, three Justices-Scalia, Thomas, and Souter-recused them-
selves from a request to stay the execution of Napoleon Beazley. Beazley v. Johnson, 533
U.S. 969 (2001). While not publicly stated, the media inferred that the reason for the
recusals was the Justices' relationship with Judge Luttig, who is the son of the murder
victim. Frank Green, Three-Justice Withdrawal Rare, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Aug. 15,
2001, at A7.
219. See John Paul Stevens, Deciding What to Decide: The Docket and the Rule of Four, in
O'BRIEN, supra note 36, at 91-98 (describing the obscure origin of the Rule of Four and
arguing that the rule may result in the Court taking too many cases); see also Lubet, supra
note 218, at 662.
220. Lubet, supra note 218, at 662 n.26.
221. Id.
222. Mark Hamblett, Court Removes Firm From Appeal Because Former Partner is One ofJudges
on Panel LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 2000, at 4.
223. In re F.C.C., 208 F.3d 137, 139 (2d Cir. 2000).
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could take similar action to deal effectively with lawyers who
"strategize" recusal.
Moreover, the choices before the justices in Bush v. Gorewere not
limited simply to abstention or recusal. The Justices could have taken
other measures to diminish the appearance of bias. One of the most
important of these is disclosure. Justices on the Court could have dis-
closed the potential conflicts that gave rise to reports of bias. Justice
Scalia, for example, should have immediately disclosed the fact that
his sons were lawyers at law firms hired by Bush.2 24 Such disclosure is
urged in the Model Code, which admonishes judges to "disclose on
the record information that the judge believes the parties or their law-
yers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if
the judge believes there is no real basis for disqualification."225 Thus, even if
Justice Scalia believed that there were no grounds to justify his recusal
from the case, the Model Code suggests that he should nevertheless
disclose information that would be "relevant" to the issue. The effect
of Justice Scalia's own disclosure of the potential conflict would itself
lessen the appearance of impropriety. The disclosure of his sons' rela-
tionships with the firms representing George Bush would not have
compelled Justice Scalia's recusal from the case. As explained above,
it is not likely that Vice President Gore would have sought Justice
Scalia's recusal. By disclosing the relevant information himself, how-
ever, Justice Scalia would have created a climate of candor that would
have fostered an appearance of integrity and impartiality.
Finally, Justices on the Court could have exercised greater re-
straint.22 6 The most obvious example of this is Justice Scalia's ill-ad-
vised leadership role in the case. His opinion explaining the Court's
decision to grant the stay revealed an inability to even acknowledge
and address the obvious arguments in favor of continuing the re-
count. Justice Scalia's determination that candidate Bush would suf-
fer irreparable harm if the recount continued, because if Gore
prevailed in the recount it would "cast[ ] a cloud upon what [Bush]
claims to be the legitimacy of his election, '227 simply ignored the obvi-
ous argument that the irreparable harm to Gore would be just as great
if the recount were halted. Justice Scalia's reasoning was nakedly one-
sided. Even more disturbing, it suggested that, as David Strauss ar-
224. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing one of Justice Scalia's son's
affiliation with Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher).
225. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr Canon 3(E)(1) cmt. (2000) (emphasis added).
226. Obviously, Justice Thomas need not have invited conservative columnist George F.
Will to the oral argument of the case. TooBIN, supra note 10, at 214.
227. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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gues, "there is a legitimate interest in suppressing truthful informa-
tion-information about what the recount ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court would have disclosed-in order to protect the Presi-
dent of the United States from political harm."228 Even some who
agree that the recount should have been stopped have questioned the
soundness ofJustice Scalia's opinion in support of the stay.229 Given
the appearance problems created by Eugene Scalia's partnership at
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Justice Scalia should have refrained from
becoming the point-person on the Court for the pro-Bush majority.
In the end, the experience of Bush v. Gore invites the Court to
rethink its current practices with regard to recusal based on the "ap-
pearance" of bias. Judges-even Supreme Court Justices-may simply
not be in the best position, without clear procedures and some form
of review, to themselves make sound § 455 (a) judgments. Judges are
not average "reasonable people." Judges-especially Supreme Court
Justices-are highly educated people of above-average intelligence,
who work in an insular, homogenous, intellectual, and highly struc-
tured environment. To imagine that Supreme Court Justices will be
able to perceive what gives the "appearance" of bias in the same way as
the average, reasonable person reflects a kind of egalitarian wishful
thinking, rather than sound policy. 230
In order to assist Justices in the task of assessing the "appearance
of bias," the Court should adopt more formalized, publicly disclosed
procedures for addressing § 455(a) questions. The Court might con-
sider creating a rotating panel of Justices who address recusal ques-
tions. Each recusal motion based on § 455(a), or appearance
concerns, would be reviewed by at least two other Justices. All recusal
decisions should be written-however briefly-and publicly reported.
The Court could also create a standing committee of special mas-
ters-judicial ethics experts-who advise the Court on § 455 (a) ap-
pearance questions and publicly issue advisory opinions to the Court
on § 455(a) issues. 3' In the short term, these measures may be per-
228. Strauss, supra note 14, at ,190.
229. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 120, at 166-67 (criticizing the effectiveness of Justice
Scalia's concurrence and asserting thatJustice Scalia's decision to publicize his grounds for
the stay increased charges of partisanship against the Court).
230. Reports that some of the Justices were stunned and alarmed by the public's reac-
tion to the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore is perhaps an indication of the justices' distance
from how average people think. See Biskupic, supra note 4.
231. I am pessimistic about the Court's willingness to act on its own in this area. Profes-
sor Jeffrey W. Stempel proposed fifteen years ago that Congress amend § 455 to address
some of the recusal problems that I discuss in this Article. See Stempel, supra note 62, at
643-44. He proposed the following amendment to the statute:
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ceived as unnecessarily burdensome and an excess of caution. In the
long term, preserving the nation's confidence in the legitimacy of the
Court will more than justify these measures.
Any party aggrieved by the refusal of a Supreme Court Justice to disqualify him-
self may, on timely motion, obtain review by the full Supreme Court. To be sus-
tained, an individual Justice's decision refusing to disqualify himself must be
affirmed by a majority of those Justices participating in the review.
In any review by the Supreme Court, the Justice who is the subject of the disquali-
fication motion shall not participate in the Supreme Court's review or the discus-
sion of the matter. The Court shall give a written statement of reasons for its
decision.
Id at 644. Of course, this proposal would not have had much effect in Bush v. Gore, where
the litigants were not likely to file a motion seeking recusal of one of the Justices. But
Professor Stempel also suggested amending the statute to require disclosure by a judge of
"facts that would prompt a reasonable person to believe that one or more of the grounds
for disqualification .. .may be applicable ...." Id. at 643. Judges would be required to
permit the parties a reasonable time to reply to the disclosure. Id. I strongly support resus-
citating Professor Stempel's proposal to amend § 455 in this regard.
